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17 July 1984

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IRANIAN, LIBYAN, SYRIAN CONNECTION IN GULF WAR ANALYZED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 3113, 8 Jun 84 pp 24-25

[Article by Jamal al-Alfi: "The Political Week: New Development in Gulf War: Can Syria Maintain Its Special Relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia?"]

[Text] Immediately after Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers were hit in the territorial waters of the two Gulf countries, letters from King Fahd, the Saudi monarch, were sent out of Riyadh. These letters were sent to the kings and heads of state of Arab and foreign countries. The first of these letters to go out of Riyadh were addressed to Libya's president, Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi and to Syria's president, Hafiz al-Asad. The special relationship that exists between Syria and Libya and the Iranian regime ever since that regime came into being 5 years ago makes Syria in particular an excellent Arab mediator with the rulers in Iran. Although Libya's relationship with Tehran is also one that qualifies Libya to serve as mediator, it is less special than Syria's relationship with Tehran. At any rate there were other justifications for the Saudi letters that were dispatched to Syria before any other Arab country. In addition to the fact that Syria has special relations with Iran, Syria also has excellent relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In fact, the alliance between Saudi Arabia and Syria has been the most prominent alliance in shaping the policies of the Arab world for at least the past 10 years. In the past 5 years relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia have become more special and more distinguished. The alliance between Damascus and Riyadh did accomplish much during that period for both countries and for Arab causes. However, the fact that Iranian airplanes bombed Saudi tankers in Saudi territorial waters last May without a reasonable Iranian justification has strained the Syrian-Saudi alliance and put it to a disconcerting test. But as far as the Syrian-Iranian alliance is concerned, the fact that Saudi tankers were bombed in the open seas will later prove that the strike against Saudi tankers was also aimed at the Syrian-Iranian alliance. After Iran dragged Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf countries into the war, it was Iran that simultaneously placed its ally, Syria, in front of a difficult choice.

Any previous talk about the influence that Syria or Libya had with the government of Iran has turned out to be merely wishful thinking. The special relationship that has linked the three countries together attracted attention and bewildered people also. In general that relationship was directed against the rest of the Arab consensus and all national and pan-Arab issues. At the outset this special tripartite relationship was derived from a political analysis that may have been acceptable at the time. That analysis stated that in return for Iran's

disruption of the Arab rank, Syria and Libya would undoubtedly be held in high esteem by the rulers of Tehran. It was thought that Syria and Libya would represent the Arab voice that Iranian rebels would find more acceptable. However, that statement was severely shaken last May. If Syria encouraged Iran to continue its war against Iraq, Syria did so because it had a reason for that. The partisan struggle between Syria and Iraq had actually reached a dangerous level. Despite the gravity of Syria's reason, it was relevant. The case was the same as far as Lebanon was concerned. There was a certain accord of opinions and interests between Damascus and Tehran with regard to the course of the civil war in Lebanon and the foreign military interventions that beset that war. However, the situation was not that simple when Saudi interests were directly endangered by Iran's air force.

The first letters that King Fahd sent to the Arab brothers were those that were sent to Syria's president, Hafiz al-Asad and Libya's president, Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi. We do not know the contents of these letters, but we may deduce that they were despatched hastily for many reasons. One of these reasons was the danger of the Gulf War spilling over into other countries besides Iraq. Saudi Arabia was in fact subjected to attack. Although Syria and Libya have reservations about Iraq, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Syria appears to be excellent in general. Also relations between Saudi Arabia and Libya were not subjected to the traditional tensions that characterized Libya's relations with the rest of the Arab world. The principal reason behind the urgent Saudi letters to the presidents of Libya and Syria may have been to test that special relationship that exists between the two Arab countries and the regime in Iran. Saudi Arabia may have wanted to find out how that close alliance between the three countries could be used and to what extent [members of that alliance] could coordinate their private and public goals.

It was expected that as soon as Saudi Arabia became endangered by the war, an active Syrian role would emerge. Syria is one of Iran's closest friends in the area, and Saudi Arabia has had an outstanding role siding with Syria in all its regional struggles throughout the past 5 years in particular. Steadfast Saudi support for the Syrians against Israel was firm. The Saudis supported the Syrian position against the agreement of 17 May 1982 between Lebanon and Israel, and they supported the Syrian position as far as Lebanon's civil war was concerned. Saudi Arabia staunchly supported what Syria considered all the time to be its legitimate rights in Lebanon. Syria emerged victorious from all these battles thanks to Saudi Arabia's material and political support which was never delayed.

What was Syria's position after Iran's military attack on Saudi Arabia's oil tankers? What was Syria's position after Saudi Arabia's oil fields came under the threat of being burned or blown up by so-called Iranian suicide squads who are prepared to see the entire Gulf area go up in flames?

It is being said that Saudi Arabia's material support for Iraq, which is making that country withstand the war that Iran does not want to stop at any cost, is exactly equal to its ongoing material support to the government of Syria. This support has been going on for many years. The Syrians can appreciate the magnitude and importance of that support when compared with what they receive from Iran, particularly the oil supplies or the rescheduling of debts.

It was expected that Syria would emerge as a country playing an important role that would be felt by the Arabs. It was expected that Syria would apply pressure on its Iranian friend to make it stop at least its war against Saudi Arabia and the rest of the emirates in the Gulf. The reservations that Syria has about Iraq have no match in the special relationship that exists between Saudi Arabia and the ruling group in Damascus. Also the situation in the Gulf on the whole, ever since the war began, is one closer to total neutrality and objectivity in dealing with the subject of the war. The Gulf states never gave up on repeating their demand that the war be stopped. They never stopped declaring their willingness to play the role of a positive and neutral mediator. In fact, the Gulf states took a bigger step when they pledged to set up and to fund a financial fund whose sole function would be to compensate the two warring countries, Iraq and Iran, if they should stop fighting. At that time newspapers mentioned that Iran's share of war damages may exceed Iraq's.

That was the situation in the Gulf with regard to the war. The dangers of prolonging the war and the need to stop that war were understood, and pledges were made to compensate the warring countries. In this case the Syrian mission was not beset by many obstacles. Accordingly, not only was Syrian mediation required, but there was also some kind of general optimism that Syria would be able to mediate successfully and that that would add much to its prestige.

Not one of these hopes was realized, and no effective mediation role for Syria emerged even though Syria was qualified for that role because of its special relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. In fact, much was written in Europe and in France describing relations between Syria and Iran in terms that were less than what had been expected. It was said that Syria did not have any influence on the rulers in Tehran and that any mediation by Syria would be treated like the best of the mediation efforts that were made by other countries. The Iranians have always ignored other mediation attempts.

Syria sent two of its senior officials to Tehran, but statements that were issued in Damascus and Tehran were disappointing. Then there was talk again about an Iranian-Syrian agreement. Afterwards Syria's support for Iran grew. At the UN Security Council Syria and Libya were the only two Arab countries that supported Iran's terrorist practices against Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf region.

Syria's position, which has been an intelligent position for the past 4 years, has been hit by misfortune for the first time. The attack on Saudi Arabia has revealed an obvious flaw in Syria's political course which was characterized by skill for a long time. The Saudis have reasonable suspicions about Syria's position which they suspect may have unpleasant consequences. Syria's special prestige in Tehran was unexpectedly undermined, and the Arab coalition, which has been prevalent for 5 years was likely to break up. Its most salient feature was that Saudi, Syrian and Gulf accord on all pending issues. That Arab coalition, which had controlled the Arab League during that period was likely to crumble from the inside. And there will be more than one Arab coalition about to emerge [to take its place].

It also appears that the justification for the alliance between Syria, Libya and Iran has been lost because the breakdown of events has gone beyond the

conventional factors for an alliance. If Iraq was forced last week to place a portion of its military troops on the Syrian borders in anticipation of any dangers that might come from Damascus, then Saudi Arabia will also be entitled to ask itself if it too is compelled to safeguard itself not only against Iranian dangers but also against Syrian dangers.

In this new situation which emerged after the scope of the war in the Gulf was expanded, there can be only one of two possibilities regarding the tripartite alliance between Iran and the two radical Arab countries, Syria and Libya. Either this abnormal alliance would end and Syria and Libya would return to their Arab world; or the second possibility, which is a more dismal one, is that Syria and Libya may come to feel more isolated and more alienated and they would increase their support for the Iranian plot even if their part in it were no more than that of a junior partner who would be satisfied with a million free barrels of Iranian oil above and beyond his quota or with the rescheduling of his debts. The scope of the war would then be expanded, and we would have to wait for more foreign interventions. It seems now that the special relationship that Damascus has had for a long time with Tehran and Riyadh--a relationship from which Syria gained a great deal--has now reached the mark of a previous stage. It seems that Syria, with its traditional skills in dealing with the diplomacy of changing conditions, will have to reconsider its regional relations so as to guarantee itself the traditional superiority it has won every time. Otherwise, Syria will lose both its allies simultaneously: the Saudi and the Iranian. And Syria will then suffer a dual loss.

8592

CSO: 4504/310

NEW ARMENIAN TARGET: 'TURKISH ECONOMY, MID-EAST RELATIONS'

Istanbul NEW MIDDLE EAST MONTHLY NEWS MAGAZINE in English & Turkish, Vol 1
No 4, Jun 84 pp 9-11

[Article published in English]

[Text]

After the brutal Orly Massacre of July 1983, Armenian terror withdrew from the scene for a brief period, only to spring into action with renewed vengeance prior to and following Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal's visit to Iran. As soon as the dates of Özal's visit had been confirmed on 28 March Armenian terrorists organised a series of attacks on three members of the Turkish Embassy staff in Teheran seriously wounding Head of Chancery İsmail Pamukçu. And just before Özal landed at Teheran Airport terrorists stepped up their vicious campaign and shot Turkish businessman Işık Yönder. The third in this latest series of incidents was the bombing of the recently-unveiled Armenian memorial in the Paris suburb of Alfortville.

These events of the past month are extremely significant, for they reveal the new targets and the underlying relations of the Armenian killers, who for ten years have been staging merciless attacks on Turkish targets.

These vicious Armenian terrorist attacks on innocent members of Turkey's foreign service began in 1973 with the murder of two Turkish diplomats by a senile Armenian. Since then Armenian terrorists have kept up these attacks. But prior to Özal's Iranian visit a new strategy was manifested: the sabotage of the Turkish economy.

For fifteen years Işık Yönder, who represented such major Turkish companies as ENKA, Turkish AEG and Işıklar Holding in Teheran, had played a major role in Turkish-Iranian economic relations. That he was chosen as a target is evidence that ASALA has now set its sights on sabotaging the economic stability programme which Turkey has been systematically implementing over the past four years, and the export increases which are an offshoot of this.

Deveciyan, the lawyer representing the Armenian terrorists in Paris, explicitly stated that the new target of Armenian terrorism was the Turkish economy, and immediately afterwards bomb attacks were made on Turkish Airlines' Paris office and the Covered Bazaar in Istanbul, in an effort to destroy Turkish tourism. The killing of Işık Yönder makes it all too clear that from now on Turkish businessmen are a target for Armenian terror.

Just a few days after the killing of Işık Yönder in Teheran, a memorial to Armenian malice was unveiled in Alfortville in Paris at a ceremony attended by French government officials and a Soviet Armenian priest; a significant illustration of exactly who is behind Armenian terrorism.

Various sources report that Armenian terrorist organisations are aiming to open political offices in Athens, Beirut and Nicosia first of all, followed as soon as possible by Paris, as part of the effort to initiate the "political recognition process". Meanwhile, the fact that the Armenian militants have found a conducive habitat in Iran and in the Bika Valley in Lebanon, is a development that is disquieting on more than one account.

France, with its extensive economic interests in the Middle East, and the Soviet Union with military plans for this strategic region both feel themselves threatened by Turkey's increasingly amicable relations with the Islamic nations over recent years. President Evren made a personal appearance at the last Islamic summit, and the bid by the new Özal government at the outset of its term in office to effect deep-rooted advances in all areas of Turkey's relations with these nations, already has some sound achievements to its credit.

Seeing this the Armenian terrorists immediately set about undermining the Turkish economy and Turkey's budding Mideast relations. What is happening is clearly a re-run of events during the First World War, when the grandparents of today's terrorists responded to the provocation of the imperialist powers and allowed themselves to be exploited as instruments of anti-Turkish propaganda.

Why have the terrorists now picked on Turkey's economic relations as a target? Who benefits from the frustration of Turkey's relations in the Middle East? Since the Armenian terrorists certainly have nothing to gain, the countries who fit this description must be those who are exploiting the Armenians for their own ends.

So which country is the real culprit? Is it the Soviet Union, reluctant to see a NATO member country gain political and economic power in the Middle East region? Is it France, with so much investment and so much at stake in the region, and other western trusts

fearful of economic competition?

Could it be Greece, working hard to advance its own relations with the Mideast nations in order to win backing for its anti-Turkish policy? Or could it be the Greek administration in southern Cyprus, which has provided bases for these terrorists in an attempt to further its own barren political objectives? If the answer to all these questions is in the affirmative, we will see that Turkey faces a host of problems in the Middle East, and at the same time see the true and unpleasant faces behind the masks of those states which view international terrorism as auxiliary to official state policy ■

CS0: 4600/629

REASONS FOR LOW VOTER TURNOUT EXPLORED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 31 May 84 p 4

[Article: "Only 43 Percent of Electorate Participated in Elections. Why?"]

[Text] Despite the participation of five parties in the elections, the complete freedom in which the elections were conducted, and the focus of the party platforms on the everyday problems of the Egyptian citizen, only 5 million voters went to the polls, or only 43 percent of the total qualified voters--less than half of the electorate.

What is the explanation for this phenomenon? What are the factors that govern the behavior of the Egyptian voter?

Professors of psychology respond to this important question.

Dr 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Jawhari, professor of political sociology at al-Minya University, says, "An interest in the common good and in voting is one of the manifestations of political participation. The opposite, political and social negativism, is manifest in many ways, including a lack of interest, skepticism, political alienation, and alienation from society."

"The absence of certain factors would result in non-participation. The most important of these include a respect for the human aspect of mankind through the guarantee of freedom of expression and the provision of opportunities to work, obtain food, clothing and medical treatment."

"The science of political sociology has determined a number of reasons for abstention from political participation. For example, an individual's participation in politics could threaten his private life, his relations with his friends and neighbors, or his social status or professional position. The results of political activity are uncertain and perhaps not beneficial. The individual might perceive a gap in politics between words and actions."

"There are other characteristics that distinguish the behavior of voters in general. A higher percentage of the educated than the uneducated participate, and more men participate than women. The involvement of

a certain candidate may increase the political participation of some people, and descendants of families that are traditionally active in politics are usually more active than others."

"Generally, when the rate of economic growth increases, income increases, and political participation increases. The above characteristics can generally explain why any group of people abstain from participation."

"However, in addition to these, the Egyptian personality has special historical traits."

"During certain periods of modern history, for example, we have worked to instill a spirit of selfishness and individuality in the psyche of the individual. Decisions have been made that were apparently in no one's interest. Each individual began to feel that his fate was not in his hands, so he tried to achieve his individual interests in private while publicly proclaiming his loyalty to the group. In addition, the hiding of the truth from the public during previous administrations spread frustration."

Mistaken Accusations

Dr Samiyah al-Sa'ati, professor of sociology at 'Ayn Shams University, says that there are shortcomings in general in the field of scientific research into the behavior of the Egyptian voter.

She says, "It is not easy for the Egyptian voter to abandon at once the electoral legacy that does not encourage participation, a legacy experienced by Egyptians during past administrations. The Egyptian voter is smart and skeptical because he has been deceived thousands of times. We must expect that his transition from skepticism to confidence will not take place at once, but gradually."

"Some accuse the Egyptian voter of not having a clear personality, especially the voter from the countryside. This is not true. The rural voter is governed by a set of values that are unique to him. For example, he may give preference to an elderly candidate, although the candidate may lack qualifications, and although the voter agrees with another candidate's program, because there are "principles."

Woman's Exclusion

"The woman's political role is unclear for specific reasons and not because she is living in a period of exclusion as is widely believed. The woman is often subsumed by the man because she is in the minority and she is governed by her circumstances as a wife and mother. In addition, there is the problem of illiteracy."

"Even if a woman has succeeded politically through conferences, symposiums, and programs, she still lacks political training and planning through programs in which psychologists, sociologists and planners participate."

Groups of Voters

Dr Fawziyah Diyab, professor of psychology and education at 'Ayn Shams University, says, "Generally, we can say that immediate advantage still dictates the behavior of the Egyptian voter."

Positive Expectations

Dr 'Adil Sadiq, professor of psychology at 'Ayn Shams University, believes that the behavior of the Egyptian voter and candidate has not progressed much with the passage through various stages of history. He says, "The legacy of Egyptian elections has made the Egyptian voter nearly forget that he has democratic rights. In addition, he has lost his confidence as a result of fraud in elections he has lived through."

He adds, "I expect, however, progress in this field in the coming period even if such progress is limited due to the absence of political awareness and the pan-Arab affiliation of the parties."

"There is another factor that contributes to the nature of the Egyptian voter. He may possess something resembling a universal mind and emotions as opposed to individual emotions. Therefore, from the purely psychological standpoint, I do not believe that campaign propaganda has any effect."

12608

CSO: 4504/286

REVISION OF ELECTIONS LAW URGED

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic No 2922, 11 Jun 84 pp 14-16

[Article by 'Abd-al-Sattar al-Tawilah: "In Lieu of More Frustration in the Next Elections"]

[Text] The Egyptian left won about 12 percent of the vote in the recent elections. Nevertheless, it did not get a single seat in the People's Assembly.

The socialist Labor Party won a little over seven percent of the vote, and the Grouping Party won a little over four percent. Both parties represent the various tendencies of the left. Twelve percent of the vote is a large percentage; it should have enabled the parties that won those votes to get approximately 75 seats in parliament. But as we've seen they got nothing.

Opposition parties received 28 percent of the vote in these elections, whereas the National Party got 72 percent. According to the system of proportional representation, this means that the National Party would win 323 seats compared with 125 seats for the opposition.

But what we found was something completely different. The National Party got 390 seats, whereas only one opposition party got 58 seats only. That is less than half of what they deserve. What is even more curious is the fact that the 72 percent of the vote that the National Party received meant that the party would get 323 seats only, as we mentioned. At the same time, the 15.5 percent of the vote that was received by the Wafd was supposed to mean about 68 seats for that party. But we found that the National Party got 390 seats, and the Wafd lost 13 seats.

Who is responsible for these curious results?

It is the new elections law that is responsible. I've opposed that law ever since the first day it was issued. I opposed the mere idea behind it and I warned about its conflicting results.

It is certain that students of constitutional law in our country and in universities all over the world will continue to study this law. They will take it as a model of a law that distorts democratic and constitutional principles, rules, conventions and theories and divests them of their content.

When scholars of constitutional law came upon the system of a proportional representation list, their objective was to avoid the shortcomings of the system of voting for individual candidates, which allows 49 percent of the vote to be cast in vain. That system allows 49 percent of the voters to be without representation in parliament where authority is fixed in any democratic country. Accordingly, with a proportional representation list any political movement or group can have its elected representatives in parliament. The number of those representatives would be determined by the percentage of the vote that movement or group would win.

In all countries that have adopted the proportional representation system one finds a truthful interpretation of that notion. One finds it in Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany or even the Duchy of Luxembourg. In those countries if a party were to win 20 percent of the vote, it would get 20 percent of the seats in parliament. For technical reasons one may find a discrepancy that does not exceed one seat more or less.

The Electoral Coefficient

A seat in parliament is usually determined according to the electoral coefficient. This means that the number of valid votes would be divided by the number of precincts, and the percentage would be determined accordingly. One seat may equal one percent of the vote, or it may equal one and a half or two percent of the vote, and so on.

In Israel, for example, 1 seat is equal to 1 part of 120 parts of the vote. This is because there are 120 seats in the Knesset, and Israel is considered one electoral precinct. No country in the world utilizing the system of proportional representation sets a condition such as that which was introduced by the author of our law: a party must receive eight percent of the total vote to get a seat in parliament. Quite simply this means that a large percentage of the votes are cast in vain, just as they are in a system of voting for individual candidates. In application this system threw out 20 percent of the vote and robbed the Wafd party of another 3 percent.

If 8 or 9 parties had taken part in the election, 60 or even 70 percent of the vote could have gone down the drain if each one of these parties had won 7.9 percent of the vote while one party got 20 percent. That party would have won all the seats in the election, and the votes cast for the other eight parties would have been cast in vain.

The Siege

Divesting laws and revolutionary decrees of their content is not new in Egypt. This is something that Egyptian citizens have become accustomed to, particularly in the age of the July Revolution. Many decrees and laws were issued [supposedly] to further democracy when they were in fact blatant violations of democracy.

The same is true of the new election law. If you want a system of proportional representation, fine! We approve. But those who drafted the law threatened the opposition and set up a rigorous siege around it.

Opposition parties could not have won a victory in the election. Our country's experience with partisan political activity has not been more than a few years during which such activity received severe blows. Partisan political activity in Egypt really began only in 1982. In fact, the largest opposition party, which is the Wafd Party, came into existence officially only 100 days before the election, whereas the National Party has had a long history of political activity. The National Party has been active since the time of the Liberation Authority, the Pan-Arab Union, the Socialist Union and the platforms. The National Party is Egypt's party. In most cases its leaders have been the same ever since the first day of the revolution. The National Party also has its cadres in all the governorates.

In addition, the National Party is the ruling party, and it has all the capabilities and all the media at its disposal. In short, it has all the manifestations of power.

If the author of the election law really wanted democracy in Egypt to flourish, he would have been more lenient in opening up avenues to democracy in such a law. This would have given partisan and political life in general a shot in the arm, and it would have really made democracy flourish and thrive.

But the author of this law wrote it when he was alarmed by democracy. There are strong implications in the law of hostility to democracy, to other parties and to political activity in general.

In all of the democratic world there isn't one election law that robs citizens who do not join a political party of their right to declare their own candidacy in an election. This denies a political right to tens of thousands of people who are interested in politics but who do not find that existing political parties express their interests. Some of these people may try to establish a party or may consider doing so. The condition that a citizen join a party is not required to qualify politically by any standards in a feudalist, capitalist or socialist age. In most socialist countries that have a system of one universal party, independents only are allowed to nominate themselves in an election.

Then there is that matter of the eight percent which fences in any party that can win a few hundred thousand votes or that can gain influence in a certain area and win a majority of the votes in that area. That party is denied any seat.

Let's give an example of what we're saying. Let's assume that there is a party representing young people and that that party has influence in those areas where universities, university campuses and factories that employ young people are located. Let's assume that that party was able to win 80 percent of the vote in a precinct whose number of seats was set at 10. This party then would be entitled to get eight of these seats. But the author of this law lay in wait for such a party and decided to deny it any seat as long as that party did not win eight percent of the [total] vote.

In fact, it is possible for a party that wins 96 percent of the vote in a city to have no possibility of gaining a single seat in parliament regardless of the number of those seats. Alexandria, which has 26 seats, provides an example of that.

What is even more curious than that is that all these seats are taken over by the majority party. That is, Alexandria residents who voted for party A found that they were represented in parliament by party B! Because the author of the law was intent on fencing in the opposition, he introduced a strange provision into the law: the party that wins the smallest number of seats is given the responsibility of filling the percentage of workers and farmers [that is required].

If we were to assume, for example, that the Labor Party's list in the precinct of Shirbin was headed by Ibrahim Shukri, the leader of the party, and if we were to assume that his name on the list was followed by that of a worker, and if that list were to win enough votes enabling the Labor Party to get one seat, the provision in the law stipulates that if the percentage of workers and farmers (50 percent) was not achieved on the list of candidates from the majority party (9 seats, for example), then the second candidate on the Labor Party's list (the worker) would replace the first candidate, the leader of the party, and he would take that one seat which the party won. This means that the party is denied having its leader become a member of the People's Assembly. It means that the law interferes in determining which voters as published are to enter parliament.

We saw this law in action in what happened to Mr 'Adil 'Id in Alexandria. He is one of the most outstanding liberal democratic parliamentarians, and his presence in parliament would have been very useful.

The shortcomings of this law were obvious from the very first day. But, unfortunately, the campaign against it was inadequate and its flaws were not sufficiently exposed. It is curious that some authors who said absolutely nothing about this law and did not criticize it either before or after it was issued are now crying bitterly because opposition parties are not represented in government. They are saying quite openly and publicly that they would have liked even the Grouping Party to win and enter parliament because the presence of opposition parties is beneficial to the country and to democracy. This reminds me of a statement by Lenin who said that our enemies would not object to praising us and weeping for us provided that we are dead.

The upshot of all this is that the election law in application revealed that it did not represent the wishes of even the majority of the people. The National Party which won a majority [of the seats] did not receive even one fourth of the votes of registered voters.

Also a large percentage of the voters who voted in the election cast their ballots in vain as we've indicated.

This leaves a bitter taste in people's mouths and creates major stumbling blocks on the road to national reconciliation for the purpose of confronting present and future challenges.

We are raising this subject now even before the new parliament is convened so that one of the first tasks of the assembly would be to repeal this law or amend it so as to make it more democratic. Egypt is not a Fascist or a totalitarian state: it should not have such a law that arouses despair. This law must be repealed or amended so that the masses can be rescued from the state of frustration that befell them after the flaws in the law were revealed.

'UMAR AL-TALMASANI ON MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD COOPERATION WITH WAFD

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 26 May 84 p 6

[Article: "Your Answer, A Response from 'Umar al-Talmasani']

[Text] In the 5 May 1984 edition of AKHBAR AL-YAWM, the honorable professor Ibrahim Sa'dah asked me a number of questions. I could not delay or procrastinate in answering, given the tactful manner in which he asked the questions. But before I answer, I want to extend him my deepest thanks for the praise he gave my book, "Gifted Inspiration." This praise comes from a writer whose pen is respected, whose pen is said to glide to heights that more than please his readers and those who love him.

The honorable professor asks about the contradiction between my previous writings concerning political parties--the Wafd in particular--and my current position toward the Wafd. Let me answer by saying that I could not be pleased with myself if I felt that there was a contradiction in my position. I could never behave as one who contradicts himself. The matter is actually extremely simple and clear. The concept of political parties, practiced correctly in some countries, means complete freedom from all restrictions. This is not true in the countries of this region, for example. There was no colonialism there. There was colonialism here. There the king is dominated and does not govern. Here all power resided in the palace. There they did not know feudalism. Here there was feudalism and money had influence with the press. There money is spent on important national problems. Here there is no such thing. No extraordinary laws and powers exist there, but here this all exists. There people are not accused of being agents and traitors, but that happens here. There they do not use methods such as terrorism, pressure, and fraud. Here, there are no methods but these. For all these reasons professor Hasan al-Banna, may God be pleased with him, condemned--and I condemn with him to this day--the concept of political parties in the form that you see it. When the day comes that the national consciousness is raised to the desired level we may have another opinion of political parties.

How, then, given all this, could the Muslim Brotherhood have entered the elections with the Wafd? Here is the answer...

From the reign of Faruq until today, Egyptian governments have closed the doors to us that have been open to everyone else, as though we were not Egyptian citizens. The organization cannot legally exist. Its magazine was suspended until its owner died, may God have mercy on him. Religious gatherings and the call for such gatherings are forbidden. Security men continue to pursue the Brotherhood day after day. The elections came and the door was closed to the candidacy of independents. Before this there was the political parties law which completely isolated the Brotherhood. Nobody could even kneel and pray with them. However, it was necessary for us to participate in the elections, so we saw the Wafd as the party closest to us, especially after Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din condemned secularism and affirmed [support for] article 2 of the constitution. In addition, the Wafd itself has not killed or tortured any members of the Brotherhood, nor does it pursue them or confiscate their money and possessions. Everything between us and the parties is recorded in the press--how they have dealt with us and how we have dealt with them. Only the Wafd Party remained for us to cooperate with in these elections. Perhaps we can eliminate the exceptional conditions and provide the people a new kind of opposition [party]. We will stand beside those whom we have opposed if it produces good, or condemn them otherwise--no more, no less. "Cooperate in righteousness and strength, but do not cooperate in sin and hostility." In addition, I have great confidence in the truthfulness of the statements of the president of the republic that fairness will characterize these elections, despite the fact that the National [Democratic] party enjoys advantages and concessions enjoyed by no other parties competing with it in the elections.

We are not taking anyone's place. The party that finds a void in its ranks would be wise to leave the competition of election until it fills the void in its ranks. I do not think that a party that includes the likes of Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, Ibrahim Faraj, Wahid Ra'fat, and others suffers from a void in its ranks by any stretch of the imagination. The Wafd is a legal conduit and the Brotherhood has a popular base, so what is wrong with them coordinating in this area to bring about good? If the Brotherhood had cooperated with the National [Democratic] Party, the other parties would have said the same thing that the National Party newspapers are saying about it now. Therefore, there is no way that we could have avoided criticism.

There is no longer a word in the Arabic dictionary that someone has not used against the Muslim Brotherhood in past decades, but the Brotherhood survives, by the grace of God, not only in Egypt but in every corner of the world. The criticisms that are leveled against us do not find sympathy with the people. They have heard a lot of this, but they have seen the sincerity of the Brotherhood in many, many of its actions. As for the youth, I can assure the honorable writer that they have not questioned me and will not question me, because what is between them and me surpasses the level of suspicion and uncertainty.

As for participation in the government if the Wafd wins a majority--and this is what we are hoping and asking God to bring about--Professor Ibrahim should know that the Brotherhood will not participate in any ministry unless the first article in the regulations of that ministry is the application of Islamic law. I would like the professor to drop his concerns about the Copts' participation with the Brotherhood in governing. During the eras of 'Umar ibn al-Khitab, 'Uthman, and 'Ali, Byzantine employees filled the offices of the Islamic government. During the era of the Abbasids Christians participated in government, and during the era of the Fatimids Copts served in the ministries. When Professor al-Banna set up a political organization within the Brotherhood, he gave positions to Wahib Dus and al-Hanukh Lubas al-Hanukh. Today there are warm ties between me and the Coptic church. We exchange greetings on holidays and special occasions. Years ago I was the first one, in the pages of the magazine AL-MUSAWWAR, to call for the release of Pope Shanudah, because I was unhappy that heads of religions should be treated in such a manner. I hope that the elections will provide an appropriate opportunity for the situation to be returned to normal in this regard. When I was in Munich for medical treatment the Coptic church in Egypt sent a message to the Coptic church in Munich asking that they provide doctors to supervise my treatment. I do not think that a greater relationship than this can exist between the Brotherhood and their compatriots the Copts.

Finally I would ask Professor Ibrahim to be confident that in everything I write, do, and say, I only seek the way of God. This is the right of every Muslim. At the same time, I do not demand that the professor be convinced or not convinced. This is his right alone. Thus, I have implored the current government from the pages of AKHBAR AL-YAWM to leave matters alone to take their usual course so that it can see with its own eyes how opposition can be an honorable phenomenon. If God wills that we should achieve membership in the People's Assembly we will not behave with the political party behavior to which the people are accustomed. If the government presents reforms, we will stand by its side, even if everyone else is against it. If the government does otherwise, we will stand against it, even if we are alone, because the truth is our demand, goodness our goal, the interests of all the citizens our desire, and the application of Islamic law our highest hope.

The Brotherhood cannot be contained by anyone, unless he can contain the sea and the ocean. It will not be subsumed by any organization because it is the call of God, something which all political parties participating in the elections have begun calling for today. Perhaps the greatest manifestation of victory for the Muslim Brotherhood is that all the parties, without exception, have placed at the top of their platforms the application of Islamic law, whereas they had all previously considered this demand to be "reactionary," regressive, and a mixing of religion with politics and politics with religion. They believed it created limits that distorted society, interfered with individual freedoms, and completely ignored what was going on in the modern world. They viewed Islam in terms of Muslims and their condition. This confused beliefs, the application of beliefs, and who should apply the beliefs. Praise God who has

guided us to where we are now. We would not have been guided had God not guided us.

Before I close, I would like to address the writers who have attacked me, accused me, and excoriated me. Their writings have provided more advertising for the Brotherhood than it could ever have dreamed of receiving had it not entered the elections. I offer them my deepest thanks for the many descriptions they have attributed to me, and I hope that it atones for some of their sins and does not magnify them.

Concerning the good professor Ibrahim Sa'dah, may God reward him for giving me this opportunity. Don't seek anything that God does not seek.

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ECONOMIC, SOCIAL APPROACHES TO HEALTHY DEMOCRACY DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 8 Jun 84 p 3

[Article by al-Sayyid Yasin: "The Future of Democracy in Egypt"]

[Text] Now that all the dust has almost settled after the hotly contested election campaign with all its pros and cons, we can pause to take a critical and a meticulous look at what happened, not only to evaluate what happened or talk about what ought to have happened, but also to look ahead into the future. We can pause to talk about the numerous possible scripts for democracy in Egypt.

The first fact that ought to be emphasized is that the masses are very anxious to consolidate the practice of democracy. Although voter turnout in the election was not as high as we had hoped it would be, the fact that voters stayed away from the polls may be explained as a kind of reluctance to accept the reality of change that occurred in the country's political climate. This is a country which is going in the direction of consolidating party pluralism and encouraging the masses to make a positive contribution.

To avoid losing sight of the significance of the election results in the aftermath of the attack launched by opposition parties against the soundness of the election measures and the government's defense of those measures, we ought to draw attention to a grave procedural error that would be made if we were to try to measure the popularity of Egypt's political parties--those parties that entered the campaign--only on the basis of the election results. The elections were completed in one decisive day; however, ignoring what happened on the Egyptian political scene before that day and since the multi-party system was instituted in Egypt, and ignoring in particular the struggle between the ruling party and the opposition parties, can lead to imprecise results. To put it in more precise terms, the results that were announced were the product of complex and prolonged practices during which the struggle between the ruling party and the opposition was fierce. Regardless of our own personal and objective opinion of the political debate that took place and regardless who we think was right and who was wrong and who brought down the level of debate and who elevated it, the fact that will remain is that this public debate which took place in the context of unprecedented freedom of thought has left clear marks on the social awareness of the people.

The marks left behind by this political debate varied from people shunning support for some opposition parties or--and this may appear surprising--broad

sectors of the people being attracted to these same parties. People were attracted to these parties either because they were convinced that these parties' criticism of the practices of the ruling party was truthful, or as a reaction to the fact that these parties were subjected to violent waves of heavy attacks. These attacks were launched on their past practices, or as far as the reorganized historically old parties are concerned, their current practices.

Regardless of the matter, what happened did. What are the problems that are confronting the Egyptian political system in the coming years, and how will the Egyptian regime confront these problems so as to solve them?

It is our judgment that there are three principal problems: a political problem, a socio-economic problem and finally a cultural problem.

The imbalance in the political representation of parties in the new assembly undoubtedly constitutes a fundamental political problem. That was the direct result of the election law which provided that voters vote for lists. It was that law which set the eight percent limit. It was evident from the outset that that limit would restrict the opportunity for opposition parties to be represented in the assembly. But despite criticism from the opposition and from independents, the law was not changed.

Thus it may be said that in the near future people will demand that this law be reconsidered.

This law with everything that resulted from it could become in the view of opposition parties the source of general frustration for the public if it is not changed. It may force the public to go once again into a cycle of political passivity and lack of concern.

This is not a matter of having opposition parties represented in the new People's Assembly. What is rather more serious than that is the fact that the lack of representation of opposition parties means that the points of view of the followers of those parties, points of view that express the legitimate interests of a class, will not be afforded the opportunity to be expressed in parliament. Consequently, the regime has to create democratic ways and means that would allow these masses to express their economic concerns and their social and political demands legitimately, regularly and effectively. One of these means may be that of broadening the hearings that the People's Assembly holds on fundamental laws which affect millions of Egyptians. Continued care in consulting with the leaders of opposition parties regularly and periodically and asking them to present their alternative considered policies for Egypt's problems may be another method.

The Socio-Economic Problem

The future of democracy in Egypt depends on a solution to the socio-economic problem. The economic problem in Egypt is many-sided although it may be summarized in a few words: reliance on foreign countries and a shortage of production. We rely on foreign countries despite all the political dangers that that represents. President Mubarak was right when he affirmed at an international conference that he who does not produce his own food does not own his political will. This reliance on foreign countries is manifested in the country's foreign debts, in the economic assistance we receive and in the food we import. The low productivity is attributable to various factors which may not be probed in this article.

Solving the country's economic problem includes correcting the distorted mode of growth that characterizes the Egyptian economy at the present time. This is despite the obvious accomplishments in the performance of the economy in recent years. But this will not be enough because the sharp discrepancy in the incomes of the social classes at the present time could lead to various forms of social tension and political instability. Accordingly, there is no alternative to formulating a clear political policy to achieve social justice among the classes. This policy must meet two goals: it must formulate a fair tax system that would actually provide that the state receive the funds it is entitled to from major taxpayers who, despite the enormous profits they make, do not pay the taxes they owe. On the other hand, the economic standards of the poor and middle classes are to be raised. These classes are suffering from the brunt of inflation, low wages and salaries and the housing shortage. The regime has to try and look into the alternative and well-considered policies that were proposed in this regard by opposition parties, and it has to derive profound benefits from these policies. Some of these most important policies are those well-considered programs to solve the housing problem.

We come finally in this brief article to the cultural problem. By that we mean specifically the value system that governs the movement of Egyptian society. Ever since the modern age of awakening began in Egypt, Egyptian society has been founded on the basic principle of separating religion from the state. Whether we call this principle secularism or something else, that principle continued to be observed until now. However, that principle is now coming under heavy attack by numerous Islamic groups. Their attack is based on [their belief] that Islam is a religion and a state.

We can assert emphatically that the future of democracy in Egypt depends on the ability of the Egyptian political system to confront this problem positively and effectively.

The danger of this appeal lies in the fact that it endangers the existing political system with all its institutions. The constitution is a man-made document; the laws that are in effect are man-made; and the political parties are founded on an imported foreign idea. Therefore, the appeal made by these groups is based on changing the political system by means of force and violence to impose their opinions.

It is regrettable that a few opposition parties have taken some of these groups under their wing and allied themselves with them for opportunist reasons that have to do with the elections. They formed alliances with these groups without carefully calculating the effect all that will have on the future of democratic practices in Egypt.

So that people would not be misguided and misconstrue what we are referring to, let's make an unequivocal distinction between the appeal for the application of Islamic law and the appeal to use violence to overthrow the political regime in its entirety and create a religious society in Egypt.

FAMOUS JOURNALIST GIVES VIEWS ON VARIOUS DOMESTIC, FOREIGN ISSUES

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 382, 16 Jun 84 pp 24-28

[Article by As'ad Haydar: "Haykal to AL-MUSTAQBAL: The Whole Region Has Become Palestine"]

[Text] Conversation with Mr Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal is of the "easy, enjoyable" nature. It is easy because as he talks it flows like a spring rain, and, as it is flowing, he does not forget his calculations or equations, so that each word he speaks has its own reasoning, its own weight, whether it is concerned with recollections of the past, the course of the present or the possibilities and dreams of the future. It is enjoyable because, as it flows, it restricts the actions of the person holding the conversation with him. This is expertise which he has obtained from his long professional work, and, when he is in the position of the person who is being addressed, he turns it into a weapon with which he defends himself before the questions he does not want to answer.

At his home in Cairo, on the banks of the Nile, which he has turned into "an organization," everything pulsates with activity. The meeting took place in the shadow of the legislative elections held a week before the conversation occurred. At the beginning, it dealt with the results of the election in terms of the present and the future, for Egypt and the Arab region. At the end, it dealt with Palestine and probabilities in the region as well. Between the elections and Palestine, it was necessary to stop at the inflamed station over the land of the Shatt al-'Arab. From the beginning to the end, the focal point was hope for change, and sorrow and doubt were the raiment that enshrouded the conversation. The solution, in all this, lay in one notion only, that we, Arabs, and Egypt in the forefront, are running, and running quickly, to catch up to the train, so that Israel will not be able to choose what we should want, by force and by actual fact, from the "plate of the Arab nation". Will we succeed?

[Question] Mr Haykal, if we take the official figures which have been broadcast on the election results, even ignoring the opposition's figures there is an obvious phenomenon, which is the great absence of voters in Egypt. Is the cause of this absence the previous period, or a lack of confidence in the elections and the period to come?

[Answer] Let us take the absolute figures first of all, the actual data of the figures and the difference in views over them. People who have the right to vote in Egypt come to about 22 million, and those who are registered in the election rolls come to 12 million, that is, approximately 55 percent of the basic total. Those who went to the elections to perform their voting duty were less than 5 million, that is, 40 percent of the persons registered. Right off, therefore, the people who took part in the elections are in reality 25 percent of the people who have the right to vote. This phenomenon cannot but draw the attention of any observer right away, but it is necessary to distinguish between two things. Certainly, there is the absence of a majority. There is an absent majority and there is a country which talks about the silent majority, which is trying to say that this is a silent majority, or an absent majority. It is necessary to break this down. Part of this majority is absent by compulsion -- that is, you have 3 million Egyptians working abroad, and they are not here. Even leaving out those 3 million, you have something which will not resolve the situation. You can say that they include people who do not have the motivation to enable them to take part in the elections. You can say that they are on the sidelines of political life in Egypt. However, you can certainly say that there is a large bloc that exists and could, and perhaps wanted, but did not wish to participate. While 5 million showed up, and went, there are 5 million others who could have gone but deliberately did not, because they either were in a frustrated state or felt that no matter what they did they would not change the results. To a large extent, what I am trying to say is that the result of the elections which took place in Egypt, or the election process, was healthy overall, although I concede that there were excesses, administrative excesses, not excesses by the police in my estimation. But where is the truth?

The group that voted took part, one way or another, but I believe that the pointed, deliberate absence of the group that did not take part could be a tremendous force for pressure if the regime wanted to be aware of it, because these people are saying, "We do not have confidence in anything." They are equal in number to all the persons who took part in the elections, and you can tell them, "If you doubted that your votes would lead to anything this time, the next time the error of this claim might become obvious to you." However, that depends on the style of the behavior from now on out. What you are saying is indeed and truly a phenomenon and is indeed a very very big phenomenon. The majority, in these elections that took place, was an absent majority. To a large degree I can tell you that these people cast their votes. They did not say "We are against the regime or opposed to it," but they lost confidence or did not have full confidence. Nonetheless, an experiment was held, and it was not a bad one. Things were said on the Egyptian street that had not been said in Egypt's history. Therefore, I believe that the people who were absent in these elections were more important than those who attended. You must take the absentees into account, you should be careful not to imagine that you can pass just any legislation, you must, in the coming stage, in my opinion, assure the people who have stayed outside the arena of participation that you intend to take serious, carefully weighed actions which will prompt others to feel confidence and will prompt them to agree to participate the next time.

[Question] What is the form and content of the carefully weighed actions which in your opinion will give these groups confidence?

[Answer] What has happened in Egyptian society? I imagine that very great changes have occurred in Egyptian society, qualitative and quantitative changes. When you say that the Egypt of today is not the Egypt that Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir took over, nonetheless, it has regained some features of the old Egypt. There are many massive new forces. There are pressures, on the other hand. Come let us see how the form of Egypt has changed. When Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir came in in Egypt, for example, in 1952, there were 120,000 workers in Egypt registered in or belonging to workers', industrialists' and service unions. Today they number 7 million. When Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir came in, Egypt consisted of 19 million people. Today, Egypt has 47 million. Today in Egypt you have among the highest percentage of university graduates to be found in the world; you have 5.5 million university graduates. You have 3 million women working. You have agrarian reform, you have the new lands that have been put under cultivation, you have also a new kind of peasant. The class structure in Egypt has changed. Even in the Egypt of al-Sadat, under the influence of the liberalization policy and the influence of the petroleum era, powerful groups emerged in which rich people appeared. Egypt, for example, today has about 100,000 millionaires, of whom half you can say are worth millions on paper. That is, someone has a piece of land and its price has risen. That person hasn't done anything, but he has become a millionaire on paper. However, he feels that he has something extra. You have about 60,000 other millionaires, people engaged in commerce and working in the Arab world. The class structure in Egypt has changed. All right, you know that political action ultimately is an expression of social interests and class forces. At the beginning there was the National Federation, and in the second period, after Suez and later, there came the Socialist Union, and it said, "the forces of the working people." The social situation has changed from what it was in the days of 'Abd-al-Nasir in every way, and part of the difference might be because of what Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir did. That is, when you come to talk about 7 million workers in the service sector, that is Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. When you come to talk about education, that is Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. All right, even Anwar al-Sadat's era left very important social traces, the liberalization class, the class of a new bourgeois attitude. It has not become fully formed, it has a great deal of money, it disposes of it stupidly sometimes, it gets it by unlawful means at other times, but it is a force in society, and bit by bit it has become transformed into a middle class that is engaged in industry or in services. Then the love of money is a reaction that is one of the effects of the petroleum era. The era of Anwar al-Sadat brought about the liberalization. The era of petroleum brought great flows of money into Egypt. Therefore, you became faced with a different social structure in which the single party system does not work. The single party worked for you when it talked for the grouping and alliance of the forces of the working people, which were trying to dissolve the differences among the classes. However, once you permitted a society of many classes, or circumstances imposed a society of many classes on you, you then had to have different political expressions, which would be expressive of these classes. Isn't that the case? Isn't it a choice that the historic class, the historic experience, will make? What happened then? What happened is that the social force in Egypt became greater than all the political

organizations that existed, and spoke for them. This is the crisis that Anwar al-Sadat sensed. Anwar al-Sadat came to speak, imagining that things were going as they were, forgetting what had gone on. All right, after the October war people went on a little as they had, and then found that something very serious had happened. The food incidents, the livelihood incidents, and the demonstrations which he called "a thieves' uprising" were in reality a people's uprising, a manifestation of an outburst by the people, a socioeconomic uprising. He could not continue to express that through the organization which he called the "National Party," or the Egypt Party. He could not, but felt that there was something else outside the organization. He started up the business of the podiums, which then evolved after that and became parties. That is, you had a social force which had become very much greater than the political organizations which you were creating. Al-Sadat started diverting the people with the peace initiative, welfare, and so on, and then one day he was no longer able to impose his power on the country, was not able to find any solution for it, and took over the whole country and put it in prison in September 1981. The incident of the podium took place. The country waited, and Husni Mubarak came. That man started to try to calm conditions down. The forces of the society include large ones which are not convinced about the seriousness of participating. I do not say that Egypt is prepared for Western-style democracy all at once. However, I do say that Egypt is on the threshold of a stage from which it can emerge in good form, and exercise an advanced, innovative, reasonable democracy. The next 5 years will show people. First of all you will be able to realize and accept a degree of participation in decision making. That is it. You then say, what are the anticipated changes? The anticipated changes, or the changes in a single basic area, are for people to feel that the elections were not a diversion to distract people but really were a means for bringing about their participation in decisionmaking.

[Question] Could we say here that the presence of a number of parties, and the trend toward democracy, were a kind of inevitable development imposed upon President Mubarak, and he must now turn that into a political option of his own?

[Answer] Without a doubt. There is no doubt about that. When you come to talk about forces which have become greater than institutions, what will happen? Either you repress these forces, in order that they will remain within the scope of the institutions, controlled, you leave the current existing contradiction as it is, or you try to make you yourself conform and let your institutions expand to the great encroaching internal forces within the basic framework of Egyptian life. If you can, what will the others who go in with you do? I said, in an interview with THE TIMES, and I stick to what I said, that what happened was not elections, was not democracy, but was a rehearsal for democracy.

[Question] Within the framework of the statistics you mentioned, do you consider that the social and class structure made it mandatory for all the parties to go back to the 23 July revolution in terms of what they embrace?

[Answer] They were assuredly compelled to do that. Even the Wafd comes and appraises the times, and talks about these forces. If we examine these

forces in the conscience of every Egyptian, there is no doubt that it will contain Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's errors and Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's benefits. However, no two people, in my opinion, will argue that the magnitude of what 'Abd-al-Nasir did was very great. People might differ over the subject of 'Abd-al-Nasir's mistakes, how great they were, but no one at all will argue that the magnitude of what he produced was very great, so great that I and others say that there are two prominent figures in the modern history of Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali and Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, in spite of the differences in the circumstances of both.

[Question] By way of example, from what I have observed in Egypt, the Islamic religious currents which all flow into the mill of violence, except for the Brothers, who, in my opinion, represent disguised violence, not apparent violence, and in the context of the absence of the Nasirist forces (who do not have a single legitimate representative, if we want to use this expression) in the context of the latest form the parties have taken, and in the context of an economic situation resulting from the new composition of this situation, is --

Haykal, interrupting:

"You anticipated me, on the second point I wanted to talk about. What is to be done, what is to be changed?

"First of all, the regime must adapt itself to the currents that are in being in the society. Second, the regime must hasten as quickly as possible to regain its youth. We must observe a number of points in the religious phenomenon; first, there is no separation between the basic ideas of Islam and the current of enlightenment. When one of the companions of the prophet, for instance, says, "Where there are people's interests, there is God's law," I would like to say that the idea of religion exists in the Arab world, exists in Egypt specifically, and exists with very deeply implanted roots. The Islamic religion in my opinion and in any enlightened view of it allows that there not be any clash between Islam and the times. Any clash is fabricated, a desire on the part of some people because they want to impose their tutelage on people in the name of religion. When I say that the regime must regain its youth, what does that mean. There are the young people. What is the phenomenon that they are facing?

"One, religion is a living, existing element in people's spirits.

"Two, the phenomenon of the spread of the religious, devout current that you see now in this form in reality lacks a view of the future, and consequently it is a reversion to the secure past. This was in no way the case with 'Abd-al-Nasir, because there was a dream, the national progressive industrial, agricultural, intellectual, cultural dream. The religious phenomenon started, in reality, hesitantly, after 1967. Then it became rampant after the gains of the 1973 victory were squandered, and the dreams of the young people who had been drafted were squandered in the trenches, in the war, and in the war effort. Consequently, in essence, as far as the majority of the young people were concerned, it lacked a vision of the dream, was a wasted dream, and consequently young people needed certainties and reverted to the

past, where they could find their identity, since the future did not want their questions.

[Question] I read an article in AL-AHRAM by al-Sayyid Yasin in which he said that democracy cannot be realized in Egypt before the economic problem is solved.

[Answer] To a large extent that is true. We said that change occurs when you open up to accommodate the forces that are growing before you and do not clash with them, and regain your youth from the loss, the lost dream. These two conditions are very important, but when we say that there are 100,000 millionaires in the country, we say that there are contradictions in the age of petroleum and the age of al-Sadat which eliminated contradictions that existed. In the past 30 years, the society has changed; there are serious contradictions which have dissolved the salt of the old contradictions, and some of them contain features of what existed before the revolution. The presence of 100,000 millionaires is a very serious phenomenon, because we are in a country whose domestic income is between \$350 and 400 per capita per year. This is a very low level. It is better than some other countries, but it is low. Therefore we are faced with a very big problem. However, when we say that the country imports all its needs from abroad and in doing so relies on a specific country, or group of countries, the issue is very serious, because it has become removed from the notion of comprehensive Arab development -- or when you say that the World Bank says this, when you say that 5 percent of the inhabitants of the city of Cairo, whose population comes to about 7 or 8 million and during the day comes to 10 or 11 million, are living off half the national income to be found there, that is, that 5 percent of its population gets 50 percent of the income to be found there, and when we look at what happened in the name of the liberalization policy and the liquidation of the public sector, the way it happened -- for example, a million people living in the cemeteries of Cairo -- can these people live in peace, in a state of mind that accepts dialogue with the 100,000 millionaires? It is not possible. When one of them says that the solution to the socioeconomic problem is to embark on a sound democracy, thus, he is normal. Otherwise, if we apply the existing law, that will be unfair to the people who are in need and will maintain the existing situation. What law in the world is not a means for creating changes in the society, indeed a means for preserving existing situations? Law means the intervention of the police to impose a specific law. The government will find itself hitting people in need on behalf of the affluent. This is a very serious social contradiction. Democracy, in essence, means that the classes of the society should feel that every one of their groups has a share of national income, of the output of national labor, and that it is a just share which it is constantly trying to improve through dialogue. However, what dialogue can take place between people who are indigent and people who are worth millions? Consequently, this is another contradiction which we must learn how to resolve. Not all people pay taxes. For example, a person is before the socialist prosecutor now who is being investigated on the charge of obtaining \$125 million. How can we say that that is a law? You have to face the three tasks:

One, not to strike out at the growing new forces.

Two, you have to regain your youth.

Three, you have to create economic and social conditions in which free, open dialogue among the various classes of the people is possible.

[Question] Let us go back to the issue of normalization.

[Answer] What I ask for is a review. I do not want Camp David to be abrogated, because I prefer to have the society say its say. What is Camp David? First of all, the evacuation from Sinai. Then the evacuation from Sinai except for Taba and some locations, because they do not want peace, because the logic of security is still the logic that governs them. Then the matter of autonomy. It has become clear to everyone that no one can take the place of the Palestinians in talking about their future. Anwar al-Sadat's fantasy that he was talking for the Palestinians was incredible. Third, the issue of normalization; the Egyptian people reject it. I would prefer that what is left of Camp David be eliminated by the Egyptian people, not a government decree.

[Question] What is your opinion on President Mubarak?

[Answer] He has not said anything we can rebuke him for. I have not tested that yet, in the sense that when he says that he came as an official and represents 23 July, he has not yet done anything that would confirm or deny that. Consequently, I am prepared to accept everything he says. As far as I am concerned, he is an acceptable party. He came after everything that happened in the era of Anwar al-Sadat, after the end of all the movie and television dreams, and started to look at the people, started to talk about a plan and planning, started by not opposing the Egyptian will. The various currents all started to express themselves. However, one must concede that during the past 2 years, the man has been looking for his options. I hope that in the period to come he will come up with these options and start to work. The coming period will confirm or deny whether he truly represents what is needed for the future of Egypt.

[Question] Mubarak is affiliated with 23 July, but there is a tendency to build a new Egypt, Egypt as a system and as an essence which will express the October war, the military victory which was turned into a political defeat. Mubarak says that we achieved victory and he wants to restore the balance.

[Answer] I accept that from him, but I would like to know who achieved the October victory. The people who crossed over and died in battle. On the front, for a period of 6 years, from 1967 to 1973, there were, at all times, at the lowest estimate, 1 million soldiers. You can say that no less than 5 million young Egyptians succeeded one another on this front, in its lines and trenches and in the training that took place on it in these circumstances. I accept that the interests of the Egypt of the future are the interests of the people who made the crossing, the people who made the sacrifices, and so far as I know none of the liberalization figures were on the bridges at the crossing. That did not happen. When President Mubarak says "I want to go back to the Egypt of October," I realize that there is no

contradiction between the Egypt of October and the Egypt of 23 July. I want you to realize an extremely important thing, which is that every orchestra leader has the right to change the music as he likes, but without infringing on the essence of the music, and when I say that I want an Egyptian society whose classes are able to realize a sort of social justice in which political democracy will be possible, it makes no difference if that is in the Egypt of October or a return to the Egypt of 23 July. The goal remains the same. However, when I say that I want Egypt's Arab identity to survive as it was on 23 July, or as it was in October 1973, I say that it was possible to realize October 1973 because it was one of the rare historic moments in which the entire Arab identity was truly realized. However, when we say "We want a totally independent Egypt," I know that the Egypt of 23 July chose, and the Egypt of 1973 proved, its independence, and it is able to move between East and West in a nonaligned manner. We know that we fought to the last screw with Soviet weapons. How can we say, after the victory, that we do not want relations with the Soviets? How can this be? You fight with Soviet weapons then accept an American monopoly over the peace process, by any mental process. Not just an American monopoly, but a total Soviet absence. How could it be reasonable for this to happen, in the Egypt of October or the Egypt of 23 July? Tell me how Egypt can be alienated from its role in Africa? Are Egypt's friends in the African continent Mobutu? Is this reasonable?

[Question] You said that the role of a historic leader cannot be inherited. In your opinion is it possible for Egypt, and the Arab nation in general, to regain its identity without a historic leader?

[Answer] Yes, it is possible. I will tell you something. It can perform a very important act, and I believe that this opportunity is available to President Husni Mubarak. How can one regain the historic moment? Through a historic leader or through a historic achievement. If you tell me that only a historic leader can realize a historic achievement, I will say no. If the democratic movement in Egypt lasts, I believe that its effect on the Arab world will be enormous, because none of the existing feudal and tribal regimes will be able to survive. Egypt is constantly infected with good health or disease. Regional and international circumstances no longer permit one to act as on 23 July 1952 or the time of Suez up to the union. The time for all this has passed, and the international balances have changed. The whole atmosphere has changed, and I believe that it is in Husni Mubarak's ability, in his capacity as a normal man, to become a historic leader, in the sense that the dream of human freedom, the dream of participation, the dream of human rights, the dream of democracy, the dream of the refusal to oppose the normal develop of society, is growing and increasing in a fashion that is greater than its institutions; if he could manage the struggles and contradictions of this entire process and Egypt passed into the democratic process with him, no regime in the Arab world would be able to face the historic effects of all this.

[Question] Even as far as Egypt, which is a country of institutions, goes, it is said that parliament's role is very pro forma, as compared with the role of the institution of the presidency. Therefore where is the democratic game?

[Answer] I concede that at this stage the role of the institution of the presidency is very important. However, there is a difference between one presidential institution and another. There is a presidential institution which believes that it must rule, in the sense that it must issue orders from above, and there is a presidential institution which feels that it can lead, that is, that it is expressing specific ambitions, and is expressing a real existing force. This is Husni Mubarak's option. It is true that the institution of the presidency is powerful, but society has become greater than institutions. We are in a society which you can no longer run by paternal authority. There are 7 million workers and 5.5 million university graduates; how can we deal with them? What will we tell them? There are 3 million Egyptians outside Egyptian territory living in the Arab world, living outside our will, who have their own views and convictions. They look at us from abroad, and they constitute a very important force. Can one oppose them? What is the role of the institution of the presidency? Is it to oppose, or obstruct, or is it to listen and answer? If it listens and answers, it becomes unisolated; it does not rule, it leads.

[Question] With regard to the general Arab situation, there is much talk about the need to set out an Arab strategy. Is it possible to establish such a strategy, in the light of the defeat which permeates the Arab situation?

[Answer] It is not true that you can set out an Arab strategy or any strategy anyplace in the world without the presence of a specific force. There must be a definition of specific interests which you must defend with a theory of security. Isn't that so?

One, there is no single theory of security in the Arab world.

Two, there are no existing forces. For example, it is not necessary, in order to set out an Arab strategy, that there be an Arab consensus, but I imagine, and this was the case in the time of 'Abd-al-Nasir, that there was an Arab strategy expressing a dominant Arab current, the nationalist current, there was a theory of security, and there was a strategy. However, aside from that, there has been nothing. The fragmentation that has occurred in the Arab world results from:

A. A difference in vision and interests.

B. There exist no forces that are able to lead a dominant trend or a majority trend, so that they can impose on others. The current situation in the Arab world is an unparalleled state of fragmentation and I do not believe that part of it, or all of it, can be attributed to anything besides Egypt, because Egypt:

Is one-third the Arab world.

Is capable, through its power and influence, if actually exercised and not based on allegations. The presidency must by virtue of the law impose leadership; it must impose it through practice. If it does not do so but lays claim to the presidency of the Arab world, what does that mean? No one elected you. All right, Egypt's absence has caused a very serious disruption in

the Arab world because one third of the Arab world is outside the Arab equation, and all the rest is distributed among various objectives. In any event, when you remove the central focal point of any movement, the movement becomes lax and diffuse.

Some Arab forces have become scattered, on purpose, and not through error, not by coincidence, beyond all the ideas and limits of the Arab world. We state that there is a distinctive Arab system which has its own distinguishing features, and forces come along and say "After the departure of Egypt we will take the Arab League and throw it here, and we will make something else by name of the Islamic Conference." What is this? What are we doing? In this framework, one cannot set out an Arab strategy. In order to set one out, a number of things are necessary. It is necessary to bring Egypt back. If Egypt is brought back, along with the ideas that will allow it to come back before all the Arab masses, then you will be able to bring back Arab thinking so that you can say that there is an Arab world with its particular qualities and its security, on which you will be able to build a strategy. In the context of this absence, you will be putting clothes on something that does not exist.

[Question] One idea holds that the absence and removal of Egypt were part of an American strategy and that the wars that have taken place in the Arab region are a Western, specifically American, attempt to turn oil from an Arab political weapon to a weapon in the hand of the West -- specifically, again, the Gulf war, the Lebanese war, the war in the Sahara.

[Answer] I might disagree with you in terms of perspective. When the Egyptian role is absent in the Arab region, it is as if you have pulled out the backbone; the parties that remain are moving in an abnormal manner, and that is it -- the backbone, with the nervous system that is in it. Therefore what has happened need not have been planned. Certainly there was planning, but the planning had two objectives:

1. To remove Egypt.

2. To create other peripheral contradictions which would supersede the main contradiction, which is our contradiction with colonialism and Israel. Fine. That is what happened. However, when Egypt was absent, and when the corruption, and the creation of corruption, that exists took place, some persons started to talk about the Islamic process only, and not Arab nationalism, with its distinctive characteristics. Therefore that is what has happened. There was no plan. No one told you "Go do what happened in Lebanon." Rather, because we did not have any awareness or procedures, those people achieved their goals.

[Question] Don't you believe that what happened in Lebanon was planned?

[Answer] I am against views which hold that there was a conspiracy. History is a conspiracy, at least in my view. What happened? Lebanon was a mosaic entity created by a group of balances and contradictions that existed in the area. When the movement of all these balances was disturbed -- note that there is nothing by name of the Lebanese nation -- there is a Lebanese

people within the borders of a specific country, which reflects a specific mosaic that is glued together by virtue of the regional and international balances. The departure of Egypt caused a basic, major disruption in the entire Arab balance, the whole Arab mosaic surrounding Lebanon. The Islamic tendency, or the tendency to dilute the particular Arab character, has affirmed all of this. Corruption, and the creation of corruption, have played their part. Consequently, there is no longer a complete vacuum in Lebanon; all the forces that exist there emerged in order to settle their accounts and vendettas. The cover which was provided for Lebanon has been taken away, and that is the result of foreign circumstances. Though you want to put your consciences to rest and say that we are the victims of an international conspiracy, I say, you are the victims of a historic disruption. However, when the historic disruption occurred, there was nothing to keep the enemies of the region, America and Israel, from exploiting it to the maximum.

[Question] There is a view which holds that President al-Sadat told Mr Ghassan Tuwayni, when he met him in 1974, "Look out, you are on the brink of a sea of blood."

[Answer] That statement was made after 1974, and I believe that it was not made to Ghassan Tuwayni. The important thing is that I want you to think, as I do, that any observer who visited Beirut in 1974 or 1975 felt that that country was on the brink of an explosion, because there was a regional disruption surrounding it, and that the Lebanese formula could no longer hold up and survive in light of these circumstances. I said, on Lebanese television, when I visited Beirut in February 1975, that I was no longer confident that the Lebanese formula could endure the contradictions that existed, because these contradictions started to manifest themselves inside Lebanon under the influence of the repercussions of the changes that occurred in the climate and the environment surrounding Lebanon. Sir, Lebanon is a mosaic. Very nice pieces of colored glass held together by an exterior frame of regional conditions surrounding it.

[Question] Let us accept what you say, for the sake of argument.

[Answer] For the sake of argument, all right!

[Question] Isn't the Iraqi-Iranian war part of this conspiracy?

[Answer] Do not try to imagine conspiracies where there are none. There is a difference between historic mistakes or blunders that occur, when there are people to exploit them. I believe that the Iraqi-Iranian war is very serious, but did anyone want it to take the form it did? What happened is that a Shiite government came in in Iran. A large block of ice came in that wanted to expand. It started to have an impact in Iraq. Iraq started to feel that it was threatened. Iraq, with its present borders, is a new entity, which arose after World War One. The regime started to feel that it was in danger. It imagined at a specific suitable moment that it could do something then; whether its calculations were right or wrong, there was no conspiracy. I believe that if Egypt had had a role, and if Iraq had been certain that it had a hinterland behind itself, that would not have happened, and that contradiction would not have led to war. I cannot simplify history to the

degree of conspiracy. What happened is that the Arab world's equilibrium was disrupted, and every party started trying to protect what it had.

[Question] Taking into consideration the subjective elements of the Iranian-Iraqi war, nonetheless the continuation of this war is a kind of conspiracy.

[Answer] Brother, tell me that it is an international conspiracy.

[Question] I am saying a Western conspiracy.

[Answer] Why a Western conspiracy? If you are concerned with something and you cannot resolve the existing contradictions, you call them a conspiracy? The Arab world found itself faced with a struggle that it could not do anything about. What ends a struggle are international parties that have an interest in ending it; here no one has an interest in ending it. The international powers have no objection to the two parties wiping one another out. Ultimately, the two parties want weapons, and later the money for redevelopment will go to these international forces. However, the basic thing that I see is that Iraq was not farsighted in planning to end this war. Every armed struggle is legitimate, but what what you have to plan for, what you have to plan for the struggle, is to create the mechanism to end it. All the time we were afraid of war against Israel. We knew that after 3 or 4 days America or the Soviets would come in and end the fighting and that the Security Council in its turn would come in to end it and stop the war. Here none of the international powers has had an interest in stopping the war.

[Question] You were in Iraq. How would you consider ending this war?

[Answer] Unfortunately, I believe that this war will go on for a very long time. I said in 1981 when I visited the two countries that this war would not end for 20 years.

[Question] You say that the war will last a long time. Can this war be confined to its present geographical context?

[Answer] The war has not yet expanded. Every day there is evidence of the possibility that it could expand. I still believe that the two great powers are not opposed to the continuation of the war. These powers do not want Iraq strong, nor do they want a strong Iranian revolution. I do not yet see a mechanism at the international summit which is able to stop the war.

[Question] Doesn't Iraq have contingency plans for this situation?

[Answer] Anyone can start a war, but it is not in everyone's power to end one. Starting a war takes place through a decision, but ending a war is outside the scope of political will and is related to dialogue with the whole world.

[Question] Let us move over to the second flank, Syria and Israel. Do you believe that the balance of terror that exists now between Syria and Israel is what is preventing the outbreak of a Syrian-Israeli war?

[Answer] What exists now is not a balance of power. What exists is that Israel needs time to digest, that is, time in which it can digest the West Bank and Gaza. The state of the Arab world is totally "mangy." Syria is standing and trying to reach a solution, and is encouraged by the fact that the Soviet Union wants to preserve its stronghold, but everyone is playing a waiting game. No one will come up with a solution, because no one is able to do so. A solution could be arrived at only in the framework of a regional settlement, and none of us is asking for one now, or helping to make one. Nor is there balance between the two powers in this region, since America has the upper hand. Therefore everyone is procrastinating, we and the Soviets, America and Israel. I am afraid that in 2 or 3 years, Israel will strike at Syria.

[Question] And what about Lebanon; do you believe that Israel will be able to digest that?

[Answer] What Israel will try to do is digest the Bank and Gaza, and after a year or two it will confront us with an accomplished fact. As far as Lebanon goes, one can imagine that the south is in danger, if the digestion process is completed in the Bank and the Strip but the attainment of a comprehensive regional settlement has not been achieved, at the top level in the world, that is, at the level of the Vienna conference (with Metternich), that is, with the parties sitting down and taking part in drawing up the map, and with these parties possessing balanced strength. Unfortunately we do not have that, and most unfortunately we will not be able to participate in it.

Here we might go back to Egypt. If we can catch up before Lebanon is digested, it will start with Syria, since Lebanon will then be a plate in front of it and it will be able to choose what it wants from it, and it can impose what it wishes on the others.

[Question] Within these Arab circumstances, including the absence of an Egyptian role, so you see the danger of the balkanization of the region?

[Answer] There is nothing by the name of balkanization. Most unfortunately, we had hoped that what would happen would be a kind of balkanization. Balkanization arose from two considerations, the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and the presence of the Czarist Russian Empire. The west also exists, and the two sides are trying to benefit from this situation, that is, to contend over specific areas. We do not have a balance of powers. The victory, at this stage, belongs to the American-Israeli forces, and consequently there is no balkanization, but rather a repartitioning, a digestion process, and an anticipated digestion. Syria alone cannot do anything; the support from the Soviet Union offers a breathing space. I pray to God that Egypt will have managed to play its part, so that we will then be ready in the Arab world to impose our view on the map of the Middle East. Otherwise, the results will be ludicrous -- countries of factions and pockets here and there -- and we will embark on a period of 100 years of fragmentation and loss.

[Question] Is there a possibility that an international solution might occur, place, an American-Soviet understanding, for example?

[Answer] Sir, the Arab world must be a party to any settlement or international solution, and if it is not a party, not even the Soviets will have a presence.

[Question] What if a Soviet-American meeting takes place tomorrow?

[Answer] If you suppose that such a meeting takes place, what will they do under these conditions? The Americans and the Israelis are present on Arab land, the Soviet Union is not, therefore the American-Israeli solution is the one which will prevail.

[Question] Where are Palestine and the Palestinians in all this?

[Answer] Palestine has become a part of a struggle which is very much greater than Palestine. The whole Arab world is now Palestine. The whole Arab world is an exhibit of Palestines. Palestine now is located on a chess square; we are all in the pawns' square, and we have no kings, bishops, rooks or knights. If we hurry up a great deal, we may just manage to advance a pawn to the rank of a bishop. That is necessary; otherwise, it will be a disaster. At one time the Arab world is playing chess, and then it is playing backgammon.

11887

CSO: 4504/308

BRIEFS

DEBTS PAID WITH OIL--Libya has started to pay off overdue debts to Turkey with crude oil. During his visit to Tripoli last month, Mr Ozal agreed to accept 25 mn in cash and 40mn in crude oil in payment for construction work carried out in Libya by Turkish companies. Libya is estimated to owe Turkish contractors some \$700 mn. One of Turkey's leading construction groups, Enka, has already marketed \$20.4mn worth of Libyan oil through Shell Petroleum. Libya has been an important source of contracts for the Turkish construction sector in recent years, Enka alone has \$946 mn in contracts in the country. If the current arrangements prove satisfactory, more payments are likely to be made in crude oil. [Excerpt] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 15, 18 Jun 84 p 10]

CSO: 4500/82

AHMED BUKHARI ALLEGES PORTUGUESE 'HOSTILITY'

Lisbon AFRICA JORNAL in Portuguese 11 Apr 84 p 22

[Article by Fernando Trigo: "The Hostility of Portugal"]

[Text] At the moment, there are 57 countries that recognize the SDAR government and in other countries the movement has been given diplomatic status through permission to open an information office or by the mere presence of a delegate.

According to Ahmed Bukhari, SDAR representative to Europe, who was in Portugal recently, the SDAR is now carrying on "very advanced" negotiations with Yugoslavia, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Greece, while relations with Spain are "at a high level, though frustrating," relations with France are "bitter," with FRG and Belgium, "satisfactory," as they are with Italy and Switzerland, and with Portugal they are like a "dialogue between deaf mutes."

The result is that Europe, in its overall level of understanding the Saharan question, now represents a "hopeful step" of such magnitude as not to commit errors of assessment that could cost dearly in the future.

This assessment still comes to the conclusion that the SDAR cause, without the backing of the big powers, is not sufficiently promising to attract Europe's commitment.

The POLISARIO was recently disappointed in Madrid, when it was not granted diplomatic status, and shortly thereafter Portugal struck a blow by aligning itself with European interests at the time Jaime Gama left on an official visit to Morocco.

In Morocco Gama, advocating the people's right to self-determination, underscored the idea of not recognizing the SDAR and of placing the question before the United Nations or the OAU.

Ahmed Bukhari told AFRICA JORNAL that the SDAR "has put on its agenda the hostility of the Portuguese foreign-affairs minister," a situation brought to the attention of the Algerian Embassy in Lisbon.

"Portugal is not now a diplomatic front for the SDAR," said Bukhari. "We did not ask for any recognition from the government, nor did we want to establish representation here. We thus consider Portugal's hostility unwarranted," he said.

According to Bukhari, Portugal's hostility is unwarranted because "Portugal has a present and future interest in the Arab sea coast" and also because "all the Portuguese-speaking African countries have repeatedly told the Lisbon government that they support the just cause of the Arab peoples and of the SDAR."

Bukhari said that "the best economic partners in North Africa are those that support the SDAR, and not Morocco," mentioning especially the position of Algeria.

"If Portugal does not wish to take sides in the conflict, then it is better to wait until it is over," said Ahmed Bukhari.

The SDAR believes that the Moroccan monarchy must choose between Morocco and the Sahara, because "the war effort is huge and it cannot be kept up indefinitely."

The SDAR, according to its representative, wants to put the problem on a peaceful level rather than that of regional confrontation, in order to create a future Islamic Republic that would reflect Maghrebian, Arabic, Third-World, nationalist and progressive values and would be strictly nonaligned.

The problem is associated with regional strategy, and the POLISARIO believes that Morocco intends to fight both Algeria and Mauritania.

At the strictly military level, Morocco has adopted a medieval tactic that consists essentially of building protective walls along certain lines of defense in the desert.

These walls are built at intervals and allow more time for defensive reaction to strike back and take the offensive.

The Sahara territory is very large and it is difficult, if not impossible, for an army to patrol immense areas of inhospitable desert.

The POLISARIO combats this tactic with modern weapons and launching pads for missiles that recently brought down a Mirage of the Moroccan Air Force.

The Americans have installed radar in some areas of the Sahara, notably Laayoune and Smara and the Bou Craha phosphate zones, that cover the entire air and sea space. The medieval walls were also built in these areas.

In regard to the referendum that the OAU sponsored at Addis Ababa, Morocco calls attention to the Spanish statistics and the SDAR says there may be as many as 700,000 voters.

While the question is under discussion, the POLISARIO emphasizes that the problem is technical and that the important thing now is to resolve only the political problem.

However, the referendum does not seem close at hand, as long as Morocco is not sure of planning in the territory and, now that Sekou Toure is dead, Conakry is becoming doubtful as the place where the conflict will be settled.

The question of the Sahara now has little to do with the POLISARIO and much more to do with the regional Islamic understanding, which, although desirous of peace, is fearful of expansionism originating in any power in the area.

Thus, uncertainty remains while Algeria is at this mement the major supporter of the POLISARIO, although certain diplomatic developments have occurred recently. Diplomatic sources asserted that Sekou Toure had sought some maneuvering room to initiate a plan to put the conflict in a new political context.

In this context the phosphate mines, the length of the Saharan coast and the chronic fragility of Mauritanian governance are not to be ignored. After all, many factors contribute to the problem of Western Sahara and certainly not the least of these is not to "shake up" the Hassan II government, which is the guarantee of stability for Europe, the United States, the USSR and French-speaking African countries.

8834

CSO: 3442/407

STABILITY, COMPREHENSIVENESS OF WARTIME INDUSTRY DESCRIBED

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 9 May 84 p 4

[Article: "During the War Years: Our Domestic Industrial Sector Is Achieving Progressive Leaps Forward"]

[Text] Industry is considered one of the important, basic sectors on which our domestic economy is concentrated. This sector represents the most effective means for developing and diversifying the domestic economy; its organizations constitute the fastest instrument and the one most capable of absorbing, taking over and interacting with modern technology and scientific achievements.

Our domestic industrial sector in the years of our just war has witnessed extensive, tangible developments in the area of the establishment of new industrial projects, in the area of the operation of projects on whose construction work was underway, and also in the area of increasing production, improving production quality, modernizing and developing production lines in various existing industrial projects, increasing their capacity and introducing the latest developments of modern technology into them, to the point where our domestic industrial sector has started to provide many goods and necessary consumer and production commodities and requirements in the markets, realize self-sufficiency in some of these commodities and materials, and manage to avoid importing them, in a manner which underlines this sector's ability to assume its important, basic role in the overall course of the Iraqi economy.

In order to become acquainted with the developments the socialist industrial sector has realized during the years of our just war, we started a parallel research journey through the Ministries of Industry and Mines and Light Industries, following up on the developments that have been achieved in the overall activities of this sector.

Illuminating Indicators

In the Ministry of Industry and Mines, we paused, at the start of this journey, with Mr 'Abd-al-Tawwab al-Mulla Huwaysh, the senior deputy minister, to review the most prominent achievements the industrial organizations and installations belonging to the ministry have made.

Mr 'Abd-al-Tawwab al-Mulla Huwaysh said,

"One of the most obvious goals of the accursed Iranian aggression against our country has been to put a stop to our experiment in development and obstruct the course of development which is occurring in all areas in our resurgent Iraq, which has managed to make the transition to the vanguard of the developing countries, having realized great steps along the road to construction, progress and development, especially in terms of industry. However, due to the Iraqis' determination and iron will, the process of development and the course of progress and resurgence have gone on, in spite of the circumstances of the aggression. Thus, our proud people have thwarted one of the most important and obvious goals of the accursed Iranian aggression. This has been reflected in our domestic industrial sector, which, during the years of the war, has witnessed the construction and operation of dozens of industrial projects. These projects have entered the realm of actual production, in order to respond to a large percentage of the requirements and needs of domestic consumption or development projects in the country, especially in the sector of machinery, chemical and metal industries.

"In the construction of these projects, in addition to reliance on the previous methods of construction, emphasis has been laid on the method of direct construction, with reliance on the efforts and powers of Iraqi engineering, technical and labor personnel, who have set a supreme example of achievement, innovation and sacrifice."

We interrupted the senior deputy minister of industry and mines to ask him about the most prominent industrial projects which have been built and put into operation in the framework of the Ministry of Industry and Mines' activity.

After referring to his papers, going through them and summarizing information from them, he said:

Important Leaps in the Sector of Electrical Industry

"In the electrical industry sector, 50 electric stations of various capacities have been built in numerous sections of Baghdad; in addition numerous electrical control centers have been constructed in major areas of the country and expansion activities have been carried out on secondary plants in a number of the country's provinces, such as Salah-al-Din, Babil, Nineveh, al-Ta'mim, Maysan, al-Najaf and al-Muthanna. By the end of last February, 28 electric stations were constructed, distributed among the Provinces of Basrah, Maysan, al-Anbar, Nineveh and Dhu Qar, while the cornerstone was laid for numerous secondary electric stations in al-Rumadi, al-Sulaymaniyah, Basrah, Maysan and Karbala'.

"The years of our just war have witnessed the construction of the most massive rural electrification project, since 4,250 villages in various areas of the Iraqi countryside have been provided with electricity within this massive project; in addition, the electricity grid has been reinforced, its capacity increased, and its reliability guaranteed.

Machinery Industries and Self-Sufficiency

"This has been in the area of the electric industry. In the area of machinery industries, numerous projects have been constructed and inaugurated, such as the electrical transformer project in the al-Qadisiyah General Electricity Industries Agency, with high technical specifications; the project is covering the country's need for electric transformers, and in addition there is a possibility of exporting the project's surplus production. There is the project for instruments and frames, the project for iron structures, and the central services project in the Nasr Mechanical Industries Agency. These projects, which complement one another, assume the task of manufacturing frames and equipment of various types to respond to the machine industry sector's need for these materials, as well as producing iron frames used in the construction of buildings, factories and bridges and building accessories such as windows, doors, insulating partitions and exterior and interior cover sheeting. These projects use the most advanced types of modern technology by exercising internal control over production machinery and computers and using the most advanced technical methods in the industry.

"In this context, the new project for the new Iraq Machinetti Marelli type spark plugs was opened in the al-Qadisiyah General Electric Industries Agency this year. The project output comes to 15 million plus a year of 20 types covering the needs of more than 90 percent of the various kinds of cars that exist in the country. There also is the new project to produce Rim buses; its inauguration and the start of construction in it constitutes further steps on the road to the development of the Iraqi automobile industry, in addition to the inauguration of an integrated line for the dry battery factory, the plant to break up used batteries, the project for fluorescent lights, the new automatic line to produce incandescent lamps in Baghdad, the Babil liquid battery plant, the electric iron plant, and the field cable and wooden spool projects."

Chemical Industry Projects

In the field of chemical industries, the senior deputy minister for industry and mines said "A paper byproducts project and a pressed wood project to produce melamine-coated wood have been constructed; these will provide broader opportunities to use this kind of wood in decor work and the production of furniture and wooden covering and partitions.

Metal Industries

"In the area of metal industries, the General Metals Organizations has constructed a project to recycle sulphur and sulphuric acid from sulphur byproducts. This is the first project of its kind in the world and the first Iraqi scientific technical study to be transformed into a productive industrial project. In addition, a project has been constructed for the department."

Mr 'Abd-al-Tawwab al-Mulla Huwaysh stopped talking, then went on to say:

"It is hard for us to talk about all the projects that have been built or inaugurated in the years of the war, because there are so many of them, but

we have pointed to the most prominent ones, since they are vital, important, strategic projects."

Industrial Research and Development

The senior deputy minister of industry and mines moved on to talk about an important aspect of development in the industrial sector, saying, "The important role the ministry played in constructing and operating industrial projects and in developing and modernizing existing projects and increasing their capacities has been accompanied by another of the roles it has assumed, which complements that. It is related to the field of research in the development of production, raising the level of quality control, defining technical problems in the industrial area, studying them in the field, and setting out recommendations to solve them by forming a specialized committee in the ministry to carry this task out which has been given the name of 'the Central Committee to Improve and Develop Industrial Products.'

"The committee has put forth planning for the development of industrial organizations and their agencies. It has realized tangible achievements from which some innovations have arisen, and their inventors have been given patents, which have advanced to the stage of actual application, since designs have been prepared to apply them industrially, and some of them are now ready to be carried out. Among these innovations is the creation of a new method for preventing the oxidization of sponge iron and preserving it for transport and storage purposes, as well as the use of local raw materials in some industries and the creation of an innovative method for foliating steel and imparting the requisite firmness to it by using local raw materials, as well as the innovation of a new method for transporting asphaltic materials, a method for treating wastes derived from the purification of raw sulphur, new methods for purifying raw sulphur itself, and also plastic electroplating and the treatment of the erosion of illuminating light bases, and the use of cane as an alternative to palm fronds in the pressed wood industry. This method has succeeded scientifically and experimentally. In addition, equipment for servicing palms, such as equipment for cutting fronds and duff, pollinating and sprinkling with powder, and manufacturing cranes with hydraulic joints and installing them on 'Antar tractors have been constructed, and coating fiber with melamine has been a scientific success.

"Alongside these achievements and innovations, which reflect Iraqi intellectual effort and innovation, there is a study in the research and development plan which the committee is relying on that concerns the performance of technical experiments to develop the design of table and floor fans, manufacture a self-supporting chassis, develop round cable which is produced into a near-triangle, refine raw sulphur by heat treatment, develop cellulose substitutes in the wood industry, and other research, studies and experiments which will be applied once their success is established."

The senior deputy minister of industry and mines said "One basic task the Central Industrial Research and Development Committee has assumed has been to seek to improve and develop industrial output so that it will have a high marketing ability and the ability to compete with similar imported goods, as well as to lower production costs, develop the use of raw materials and

local refining and substitute them for imported goods. The committee has made big strides on this road."

The Most Massive Industrial Housing Project

Mr 'Abd-al-Tawwab al-Mulla Huwaysh, the senior deputy minister of industry and mines, continued the journey of examining the development the industrial sector has realized by referring to the issue of industrial housing, saying "With the expansion in the number of industrial installations and the escalation and effect on work in the industrial sector, the base of labor in this sector has broadened and the reliability of housing for the people working in this sector, especially in installations remote from towns, has had great importance in organizing the productive program which has been planned for these installations and resolving a part of the problem of housing congestion in the country. Therefore, the Ministry of Industry and Mines is now concerned with the issue of industrial housing, and the ministry's General Industrial Housing Agency has constructed numerous massive housing sections which have been built in accordance with the most modern architectural designs. The success of this experiment has had positive results, which have been embodied in the buttressing of economic and industrial activity, the creation of a firm direct link between workers and industrial installations, and savings in time and energy.

"The housing units for whose construction the ministry has made contracts in the past 4 years as a part of the industrial housing projects in various provinces of the country total 11,500; of these about 4,000 units have been built so far, while construction work on the other remaining units is underway."

Light Industries: Rising Production Rates

The second station at which we stopped in the journey to investigate the development our domestic industrial sector has realized in the years of our just war was the Ministry of Light Industries.

We began the completion of the journey with Mr Ahnaf Muhyi-al-Din, the senior deputy minister, by reviewing the achievements the Ministry of Light Industries and the agencies belonging to it have realized.

Mr Ahnaf Muhyi-al-Din said, "In spite of the abnormal circumstances the productive industrial agencies belonging to the ministry have faced during the war years, these agencies have managed to realized higher production rates and an improvement in production quality. For example, the total production yield achieved by the units belonging to the ministry last year, 1983, the third year of the war, indicate that a rate of development of 21 percent was attained, relative to the production realized in 1979, in fixed prices, in spite of the circumstances which the agencies belonging to the ministry faced during that year, such as the reduction of the investment program, non-Iraqi labor, the production plans governing some major products, and the tendency to import them ready-made rather than importing the primary materials for them and processing them locally.

"All the organizations belonging to the ministry helped realize this sort of development in production rates, though at different proportions. Construction materials realized a rate of development of 61 percent, while textile industries realized a rate of development of 10 percent, food industries 8 percent, and the mixed industrial sector 30 percent.

"The main factors behind this development in the productive activity of the ministry's organizations, notwithstanding the 19 percent drop in the number of people working in them in 1983 relative to their 1979 level, were the start of operation of the new projects which were built and the modern lines which went into production in 1980. Of these, the most significant were the construction industry projects, as well as the 50 percent improvement in the productivity of the people involved through the care, sincerity and zeal of the people working in these organizations, their patriotic support, and their compensation for the absence of their colleagues who had gone to the battlefronts, as well as the measures the ministry has taken, which have been embodied in the expanded application of systems of incentives and an orientation toward the establishment of technologically advanced new projects which require less labor and have started production in recent years."

The Map of New Projects

We paused to ask the senior deputy minister of light industries about the new projects which were put into operation or established during the war years.

He answered by stating, "The ministry's plan included the setting out of priorities on whose basis the projects would be carried out and their execution accelerated -- especially the projects on which work had started that had gone through advanced construction stages. In the context of this carefully studied plan, steps were taken to finish the cement projects in the construction industries sector on time, to eliminate the shortage that had occurred in that important building material and build up a surplus in it. In this area, the Kabisah cement plant was put into operation with a capacity of 2 million tons a year along with the second expansion in the Badush cement mill, with a capacity of 1 million tons, as well as the light concrete project in Baghdad, the (tramstone) project and the completion and expansion of the first line in the lime plant in Karbala', with emphasis on the operation of this project, in view of its connection with the operation of the tramstone plant, since lime is the basic material in the production of tramstone. In addition, there is the construction of the fuller plant in Karbala' as part of the lime project, and the gypsum plants in al-Sulaymaniyah, Hit, Tal'afar and Salah-al-Din.

"The construction of these projects all together will guarantee that it will be possible to meet local needs for building materials however their consumption might escalate in the future and provide a production surplus which will allow for export activity.

"In the textile industries sector, many projects have been put into operation, such as the children's readymade clothing project in Mosul, which has been designed to produce 1.23 million different pieces of children's

clothes. This project was constructed and completed in the years of our just war. In addition, the production lines were developed and modernized and expansions were carried out in the factories of the General Textile Agency in Mosul, where old machinery and equipment was replaced with new facilities and the most modern advanced technical methods in the area of textile industry were introduced, helping upgrade the quality of its products and reduce labor by a large percentage.

"In the food industries sector, the soda water plant was put into operation at high production rates; this will help eliminate the scarcity our markets have been suffering from in the summer. In addition, the mineral water plant in Bani Khaylan and the starch and dextrine plant in al-Hashimiyah were put into operation and new lines were added to produce canned vegetables in the Karbala' canneries, construct dairies and milk collecting centers belonging to them in al-Miqdadiyah, Takrit and al-Qadisiyah, develop the production lines in the Baghdad, Irbil and al-Sulaymaniyah cigarette plants and build a new line to produce Rothman's cigarettes in the Baghdad cigarette plant."

The Mixed Sector Also Has Its Part

The senior deputy minister of light industries continued his discussion by saying "While these achievements have been made in the field of the socialist industrial sector, the mixed sector has also had its prominent part in stimulating and developing some aspects of light industries, since this sector has witnessed the operation of a number of new plants and the construction of other plants during the years of our just war; during these wars the plant to produce plastic pellets and the plant to coat sponge (duwashiks) in the National Chemical and Plastic Industries Company were put into operation, as well as the sponge reconstitution plant with a capacity of 400 tons a year and the project to expand the plant to produce plastic sheets, covers and cups. In addition there was the operation of the tile and mosaic plant in al-Kurmah and the operation of the new automatic lines in the new Light Industries Company's refrigerator factory to produce frames and doors, in addition to the operation of the automatic conveyor belts in this plant and the linkup of productive sections of the heater and stove factory with conveyor belts and the construction of a new freezer plant."

We pause at the end of this journey to find that the developments and achievements which our domestic industrial sector has realized in the years of the war of aggression imposed on our country not only reflect the state of progress, prosperity and extensive development this important economic sector has achieved, in a manner which has made it one of the basic important pillars on which our domestic economy depends -- they also reflect the magnitude of the effort made to develop and modernize this sector, introduce the most modern advanced technological methods into it and expand its productive activities in a manner which will achieve a leap forward in this sector's condition and destiny.

BRIEFS

ELECTROTHERMAL CONTRACT SIGNED--Baghdad, 13 Jun (INA)--Iraq signed a contract here today with the South Korean Hyundai Company for implementing a huge electrothermal power station in Iraq. The contract was signed by the Iraqi Minister of Industry and Minerals Subhi Yasin and Hyundai's Director M.B. Lee. The project, whose first stage will be accomplished in 3 years, aims at meeting Iraq's overgrowing needs of electricity. [Text] [Baghdad INA in English 1555 GMT 13 Jun 84]

REFUGEE ON SYRIAN-IRANIAN COOPERATION--Baghdad, 16 Jun (INA)--An Iranian refugee has revealed that the Khomeyni guards who were sent to Lebanon in the summer of 1982 are cooperating with the Syrian regime's forces and the Zionist invasion forces in order to strike at the Palestinian revolution forces. He said: The Iranian regime informed these guards of this, and I was one of them. This refugee, Private (Majeed Reza Gholam Gelali) from the 201st tank battalion, 1st brigade, 16th armored division in Qazvin, was speaking during a television interview carried here tonight. The Iranian refugee, who was affiliated with the Khomeyni guards before his military service, said that the Iranian regime knows that the end of war with Iraq means its own end. Therefore, it insists on continuing this war. He added that if the Iranian regime insists on not ending this war, the Iranian people will move to overthrow it. He described the situation in Iran as dreadful, and said that there is no freedom. He added that because of the Khomeyni guards' hegemony, no one can express his hatred of the war or criticize the deteriorating economic situation. He said: The fate of anyone who attempts to do so is annihilation or the prisons which are spread throughout Iran. He pointed out that relations between the Khomeyni guards and the armed forces are very bad, and that the military men have no desire for this war on which the Iranian regime insists. The Iranian refugee, who sought refuge 5 days ago, expressed his satisfaction with the treatment he has received from the Iraqis. He said that this treatment is beyond description. [Text] [JN162047 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1950 GMT 16 Jun 84]

CSO: 4400/279

FORMER PRESIDENT CAMILLE SHAM'UN DISCUSSES POSSIBLE FORM OF GOVERNMENT

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1436, 11 May 84 pp 21-22

[Interview with Camille Sham'un former Lebanese president, by Sharbil Raghib: "Confederation and Federalism Are the Form of the New Lebanon; It Is Also Possible to Use Administrative and Political Decentralization"; date and place not specified]

[Text] One of the most prominent results to come out of the Lausanne conference was the undeclared alliance between the two pillars of the Shuf region, former President Camille Sham'un and Walid Junblatt. In a single session, the two of them were able to draw up a new framework for the Shuf region that called for the creation of a Christian-Druze commission to study the modality of the return of the Christians of the Shuf to their villages and houses. The commission was also to work to remove the effects of the past, which were left by the mountain war after the Israeli withdrawal from the area.

After former President Camille Sham'un returned to Beirut, he went on to set up a commission belonging to the National Liberal Party. The body was headed by Professor Antoine Shuwayri and had three other members, who represented the Christian areas of the Shuf.

The agreement between former President Sham'un and Walid Junblatt stipulated that a joint commission would be formed with six members, Three would come from each side. At the time, the leader of al-Mukhtarah had hinted that it was possible that his representatives would be Marwan Hamaday, Tawfiq Barakat, and Da'ud Hamid.

However, after his return from Lausanne, Walid Junblatt interested himself in the developments that had taken place in the western region, in which his party had been an effective actor. According to sources close to former President Sham'un, he has not and will not remove his attention from this commission. The National Liberal Party is currently drawing up files and doing studies on every area and region in the Shuf, in preparation for determining the losses and the damage, as well as for setting priority in the process of returning with respect to intact homes and villages that do not have an intense sectarian mix. In addition, it is

necessary for the air in the country to clear in general and to open the sea road so that the Christian refugees can return to the Shuf in waves. Optimism concerning the possibility of successfully achieving this step has been increased by Walid Junblatt's call on the people of the villages surrounding Bayt al-Din to return to their homes as a first step in the return of all the inhabitants of the Shuf to their homes and villages.

Since the Lausanne conference, former President Camille Sham'un has been affirming that Lebanon's problems can only be solved by federalism and broad-ranging administrative and political decentralization. He has consistently affirmed the need to set up a government of national unity and a constituent commission. That is, he wants all to be bound literally by the decisions of the Lausanne conference. Today, now that the national coalition government has been formed, does former President Sham'un still have the same political vision?

[Question] Following the failure of the Geneva conference, the Lausanne conference, the Higher Political Security Commission, and the cease-fire, the Lebanese are asking where they are going.

[Answer] They are going to Damascus. This is shown by the visit of President Amin al-Jumayyil to the Syrian capital. It is thought that he has high hopes for this visit, because it will produce the results that should have come out of Geneva, Lausanne, and the Higher Political Security Committee.

[Question] Does Your Excellency think we are facing a positive or a negative stage in the history of Lebanon?

[Answer] I believe that we are heading for positive developments. We have had enough negative developments, and the country can no longer stand them. International public opinion has played up the negative things Lebanon is suffering through. Everyone is waiting for Lebanon to enter the stage of positive developments. These developments depend on the policy of the Syrian Government. If this government has a good policy toward Lebanon, then I believe that the situation in Lebanon will incline toward the positive. The opposite is also true.

[Question] By positive developments, does Your Excellency mean Lebanon's return to the situation that prevailed before the war, or positive developments in the process of creating a new system for the country, with demographic redistribution and the introduction of a new form of government? Or will we stick with the 1943 formula [National Pact]?

[Answer] There need be no new population distribution in Lebanon. It is not essential to set up a new political system. Of course, the 1943 formula is no longer suitable for governing the Lebanese, since it does not assure broad decentralization. In my opinion, either confederation or federalism might be the new form for Lebanon. By this I mean a mixture of administrative and political decentralization. In the end, this form would not change Lebanon's situation or structure at all.

[Question] The question being asked today is how this federalist solution can be applied. Who will assume the presidency of the federal state?

[Answer] It can be applied normally, as it has been in West Germany and the United States of America, as well as in Yugoslavia and Switzerland. More than 20 countries in the world have applied the federal system, and some of them are most important. Why do you want it to fail in Lebanon? One must accept the social structure of Lebanese society, which classifies it as a pluralistic society. In addition, it is necessary to develop its institutions in the direction of a federal system, which is appropriate to its structure, respects it, and is more consistent with the changes the circumstances of the war have brought forth.

[Question] All through their history, the Lebanese have had the idea of the one Arab nation. They have worked to eliminate the idea of sectarianism from their minds, souls, and texts, and they had made great progress in this area before the war. How can this idea be eliminated from their minds today?

[Answer] The Lebanese have been taught that they are a single nation or a single, unified society, and that their division into sects is a flaw that must be done away with. The truth is that they should have been taught the reverse. It should have focused on the need for mutual recognition among the sects, as a means of achieving mutual respect and coexistence based upon trust. The Christians should understand that the Muslims are not an exact duplicate of themselves, and vice-versa. It is necessary to respect this difference instead of scorning it and thereby nourishing the gaps between the sects.

[Question] The opponents of federalism in Lebanon say that this system arose in countries that were in need of unification and unified on the basis of it. But in Lebanon, according to their view, the intention is to establish barriers among the Lebanese, both in human terms and in regional terms, in preparation for the achievement of partition. Is this correct?

[Answer] Experience has shown that no federal country in the world has disintegrated, while numerous unified countries have done so. Thus, it is incorrect to say that the confederal system is a system of partition, that it prepares the way for partition, or that it would expose Lebanon to partition, if we adopt it as a political system for ourselves. Instead, the opposite is true. This system tends more to unification than to separation. In addition, it would protect the country from the threat of division and partition. Moreover, it is the only way to establish a powerful, competent, balanced state.

[Question] Lebanon adopted the principle of sectarian balance and distribution in administration and politics and then fell victim to sectarian warfare. If it adopts the federal system and each sect becomes independent of the others, what will happen?

[Answer] The method of sectarian representation that was adopted in Article 95 of the constitution was based on the notion that the Lebanese sects were temporary groups that had to be fused and melted into a single national group in keeping with the logic of the unitary state. Lebanon thus remained in a state of confusion, caught between the elimination of this method and its retention. It is true to say that till this hour, it has been impossible to either eliminate this method or apply it completely and correctly, since the latter option conflicted with the logic and principles of the unitary state. Moreover, the Lebanese sects continued to hold to their specific characteristics and identities, as is their right. The circumstances of the war, which have continued in Lebanon for nearly 10 years, have demonstrated how eager the sects are to maintain their identities and specific characteristics, as well as how much they cling to their special rules, especially with regard to matters of personal status.

[Question] The Lebanese Front presented a memorandum to the Lausanne conference in which it explained its point of view on federalism and decentralization. What is the broad outline of the suggested new system?

[Answer] Lebanon will be a confederal, independent, Arab republic composed of numerous sectors, whose administrative outlines can be determined at a later date. Lebanon will form a single land in terms of economics, financial matters, and customs fees. It will be impossible to establish any barrier or restraint of any kind within the confederal state. Moreover, the confederal capital will be Beirut, which will be the headquarters of the confederal authorities and the higher agencies of the confederal state.

In addition, the confederal executive authorities will handle matters of foreign policy and foreign diplomatic representation. They will be responsible for the common currency, the finances of the state, customs, the system of fees and taxes owed to the central state, national defense, civil and criminal law, optional civil law on personal status, real estate law (with ownership by non-Lebanese being forbidden), and general planning policy in all fields that are of interest to the Lebanese as a whole.

[Question] And decentralization?

[Answer] With respect to decentralized organization, Lebanon will be partitioned into sectors. The capital of Beirut will be one of them. Each sector will be divided into districts. The greatest possible amount of attention will be given to sectarian homogeneity in the determination of the borders of the districts. The affairs of each sector will be administered by a governor, an executive council, and an evaluative council. The districts will have all the powers that do not conflict with the powers of the confederal authorities and the provisions of the constitution. There will be a special organization for the capital of Beirut.

[Question] Your Excellency attaches great importance to the formation of a national coalition government. If the notables in Lausanne were unable to achieve practical results in the area of putting a limit to the Lebanese crisis, will it be possible for a government that represents them in Lebanon to do so? Can it agree on that which they disagreed over in Lausanne?

[Answer] This is possible, if each side gives in a little on its demands and we reach agreement. If they insist on their demands 100 percent, there will be no agreement.

[Question] If agreement is not reached, where will destiny take us?

[Answer] To Hell.

[Question] What has become of the Christian-Druze commission to whose formation you and Mr. Walid Junblatt agreed in Lausanne?

[Answer] Everything is ready on our side, and we are here. We have formed our own commission, but we are waiting for Walid Bey to return to al-Mukhtarah or Beirut, so he can look into the commission he will empower. Then the Christian-Druze commission will meet in order to discuss all matters relating to the Shuf and the return of the refugees to their villages and home.

[Question] Then is it possible that the National Liberal delegation will go to al-Mukhtarah in order to discuss these matters with Walid Junblatt?

[Answer] The meeting can take place in al-Mukhtarah, in Beirut, or at any other place. It is not important where we meet. Instead, we must attach importance to the meeting itself.

[Question] Who will guarantee security in the Christian regions and villages whose inhabitants will return?

[Answer] In Dayr al-Qamr, security is currently in the hands of the internal security forces. The same will be true of the other villages in the Shuf and 'Aliyah whose inhabitants will return.

[Question] Under the current circumstances, can the security forces maintain security and prevent acts of revenge and vengeance and new expulsion operations?

[Answer] If there is a political agreement between us, then everything will become possible. The security forces will be able to take charge of security affairs by themselves in the villages and towns of the mountain.

[Question] There is a lot of talk about Antoine's republic extending itself to the Shuf and taking over security and administration there. In your opinion, is this possible?

[Answer] Antoine Lahd has no republic. Instead, he is acting within certain security measures. These measures deal with the south alone and do not extend to the Shuf.

[Question] Is it true that Your Excellency was behind Antoine Lahd's appointment as the commander of the Army of Southern Lebanon?

[Answer] I was not behind this appointment. Instead, circumstances imposed it. I believe that he is a very prominent military and political personality!

12224

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FORMER PREMIER DISCUSSES DOMESTIC, EXTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1438, 25 May 84 pp 17, 19

[Interview with Salim al-Huss, former prime minister, by Bari'ah 'Alam-al-Din: "There Is an Uprising of Dignity and Honor in the South"; in London, date not specified]

[Text] When former Prime Minister Salim al-Huss left Beirut, the ministerial "brew" was being cooked up on a high flame. It did not enter into his calculations that he would be representing Lebanon at the conference of Arab foreign ministers held in Tunisia last Saturday.

Political observers who nickname Premier al-Huss "the mobile operations room" realize full well that he was compelled to leave Lebanon "in the heat of the rush," after having helped prepare the ministerial statement, because he had made a previous commitment, prior to the formation of the new cabinet in which he occupies the positions of the Ministries of Labor and Education, in response to an appeal from the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor to give lectures on the Lebanese issue.

However, a few hours before Premier al-Huss left Michigan for Beirut, at 0300 hours in the morning, Michigan time, he received an urgent telephone call from Premier Karami, who was then heading for the Council of Ministers in Bikfaya, imploring him to represent Lebanon at the foreign ministers' conference.

Premier al-Huss had to go through the British capital to get the plane for Tunis.

Between the plane from Michigan and the one headed for Tunis, AL-HAWADITH had a chance to exchange some ideas with the acting foreign minister and minister of labor and education, Premier Salim al-Huss, on the deep-rooted Lebanese crisis. Al-Huss lived through this crisis for more than 4 years, and he had his efforts and ideas regarding it, just as he had made fortunate, blessed acts of mediation with all the belligerent parties.

Concerning the conference of foreign ministers of the Arab countries in Tunis, Premier al-Huss said:

"I consider it my duty to address myself to the Lebanese issue from its various angles, including what must be done in the Arab context to end the

Israeli occupation and the support our fraternal Arab countries are expected to offer in the area of reconstruction, now that the new government, the government of national unity, which it is hoped will be able in a short time to put a final limit to the deterioration in security which has occurred in the Greater Beirut and other areas, has come into being.

[Question] Therefore Lebanon's situation is headed for a revival.

Premier al-Huss considers that what is going on on the arena in the south is a phenomenon whose likes are rare in modern Arab history. It is in reality an uprising of dignity and honor. Perhaps the most awesome aspect of it is the sight of the resistance of people with bare arms and reverberating cries expressing their rejection of lowliness and degradation: "I believe that the picture of the situation in the south must be known as it really is in the Arab world, so that our brother Arabs will be aware of the historic responsibility which devolves upon all of us in supporting the perseverance in the south and helping it along by all possible ways and means, so that it can be liberated from the noose of the Israeli occupation."

[Question] Before the abrogation of the 17 May agreement, the people who were in favor of abrogating it were asked "what is the alternative?"

[Answer] I was one of those who said that the 17 May agreement had to be abrogated no matter what the alternative to it was, because it was not basically an instrument for liberation; rather, it was an instrument for subjecting all of Lebanon, and through that, all the Arabs, to the Israeli will.

Aside from the stipulations the 17 May agreement contains which do violence to Lebanon's sovereignty, detract from its dignity, and threaten its security and the security of its Arab neighbors, I have always tried to draw attention to a point which has often been ignored, which is that the accursed agreement compelled Lebanon to give what it did not have, and that it avoided mentioning the two expressions "peace" and "the normalization of relations," though the text of the agreement that was signed proceeded to set down the two matters without mentioning them.

In the context of peace, a statement appeared in the agreement calling for an end to the state of war and the exchange of representatives, if not at the level of ambassadors.

As far as the normalization of relations is concerned, mention of the word did not appear in the agreement; instead, a stipulation was made on the development of mutual relations in the economic, financial, cultural, communications and other contexts in one of its articles.

Therefore, President al-Huss considers that we must draw a lesson from the Camp David agreements which it unfortunately appears we have not learned.

[He stated] "The Camp David agreements frankly stipulated peace and the normalization of relations. What was the result?"

"Frankly, the contractual peace has not been converted into peace for Israel or the region, for the reason that Israel launched its war on Lebanon after

the peace agreement was concluded at Camp David and is still warning, menacing and threatening with its arms, and Israeli society is still fragmented over the issues of peace and war.

"If this is the situation as far as Egypt, the greatest Arab country, is concerned, what can one say about Lebanon, which is the smallest Arab country?

"If Egypt could not guarantee Israel's peace through the peace treaty, and consequently could not guarantee the peace of the region, how could Lebanon?

"The fact that no one argues about is that these two matters, that is, peace and the normalization of relations, belong to the whole region, and consequently no country, by itself, can act on them.

"If Israel is really concerned with peace and normal relations with its neighbors, it has to negotiate with the Arab countries as a group, and not deal with them in isolation, country by country.

"Otherwise, Israel will find itself, time and again, incapable of realizing the peace and normal relations it claims it wants.

"There must be a lesson in the Egyptian experience which will suffice to confirm this fact."

[Question] What in your belief are Lebanon's capabilities vis-a-vis Israel?

[Answer] It is clear that Lebanon cannot militarily fight Israel, which has capabilities, owing to American aid, that Lebanon does not have.

However, Lebanon can fight it politically, in the media and diplomatically, in an effective manner, exerting pressure that will cause Israel extreme embarrassment in the international community if it remains in the south.

One should bear in mind, nonetheless, that Lebanon has not ruled out of its calculations some day entering into specific security arrangements with Israel which will allow it to preserve its sovereignty and dignity, through the development of an armistice agreement, for example, so that it can respond to the requirements of the stage.

Here, on this occasion, I might mention that the Lebanese government decree which called for the abrogation of the 17 May agreement leaned toward an expression which refers to Lebanon's readiness to set out security arrangements which would themselves be the alternative.

[Question] The fact is that the socioeconomic problem that Lebanon is suffering from is no smaller than the political or security problem. In your capacity as the economist whom President Sarkis chose to lead Lebanon's reconstruction process, the one who best knows Lebanon's economic needs and the forthcoming stage of development in the event the Lebanese peace process succeeds, [rest of sentence missing]?

[Answer] The fact is that reconstruction requires much material support from affluent fraternal countries.

There is no doubt that social problems take priority in the government's redevelopment activity; foremost among these are the problem of the migrants and the dispossessed and the problem of unemployment, which has started to emerge in a manner which warns of the most grievous consequences, along with the accompanying inflation, which is reflected in the escalation of level of prices in a manner which threatens the standard of living in the country and also the proper ordering of economic and social relations among various segments of the public.

The Arab summit conference held in Tunis in 1976 spelled out aid of \$2 billion for Lebanon; that was supposed to be paid in five annual instalments at a rate of \$400 million a year.

I personally attended the conference at that time, in my capacity as prime minister at that time, and I am sad to say that this aid has not reached Lebanon in full, in view of the negative developments which once again have emerged on the Lebanese stage in the security and political contexts. Today, we must renew the effort to obtain Arab aid to rebuild Lebanon, for two main reasons:

One, because we aspire, with much hope, to the possibility that the new cabinet will succeed in bringing about the security and stability that all the people want. That should be considered a condition for embarking on any broad redevelopment activity, on the scale of what is needed in the context of the tragic circumstances the 10 years' ordeal has underlined.

Two, because the developments in the recent period, since the holding of the Tunis summit, when the abovementioned aid was determined, have been so serious as to call for a radical review of our Arab brothers' readiness to aid Lebanon.

We all know that these developments include the Israeli invasion of summer 1982 and the accompanying extensive destruction of the structure of the Lebanese economy, then the successive waves of dissension which Israel engineered while it was in and around Beirut. The most violent thing to take place in this context was the destructive war which flared up in the mountain after the Israeli occupation forces had withdrawn from it, then, after that, the destruction and ruin that resulted from the collapse of the situation in Beirut and its suburbs.

[Question] Is this cabinet, which has not yet been able to agree on a government statement, not to speak of the issues of the army and the desired political reform, destined to survive?

[Answer] The basis by which the cabinet got in motion was not as we had wanted. After it faltered in getting in motion, because of problems related to its composition and the distribution of the portfolios in it, it clashed with actions in the form of the collapse of the security situation, which almost eliminated its luster and inhibited its forward progress. While we say this, we must acknowledge the actual situation.

There are citizens who have started to ask, if this cabinet cannot bring about security, what is the justification for its existence, with the

representatives it contains from the most important military factions present on the actual ground?

If this cabinet does not succeed in realizing rapid achievements in the security context and in the context of developing a united position on confronting the Israeli occupation, I am afraid that the thinking which involves questioning the justification for its existence will prevail.

[Question] Are you optimistic that the cabinet will succeed? How do you view the coming stage?

[Answer] I sincerely hope that the ministerial statement will be a chance to express a unified, frank, clear Lebanese position on the circumstances of the liberation of the south and the west al-Biqa', and I also hope that the government will succeed in adopting the necessary radical measures and implanting security on firm bases.

The first component of success in the security context is agreement over the steps that are needed in order to reorganize the army in a manner that will respond to the requirements of the stage.

Specifically, what are required are measures which will restore to the army its national role of serving the just legitimate authorities.

Of course, that requires an extensive organization which will deal with the structure of the army on all its levels, from head to toe, now that Legislative Decree 10 for 1983, and, after that, Legislative Decree 102, have done damage to the improvements which the defense law had introduced in 1979. On top of that one should bear in mind that I am not one of those who firmly insist on the letter of the law issued in 1979; I would welcome any recommendations that might be presented to amend it in the light of the experience gained by applying it.

[Question] It is said that this cabinet is not a cabinet of political reform but just an armistice cabinet; what is Premier al-Huss' opinion on this statement?

[Answer] I consider that this cabinet has specific tasks which one could summarize under four headings -- one, liberation, two, security, three, the treatment of social problems, and four, political reform. I believe that the need for this cabinet will be eliminated when the requisite vital point is reached as far as these issues go, and its life, therefore, is connected to the performance of the tasks assigned to it. If we want to be optimistic, we must call it the castle of life, because thus it will rapidly have realized what has been hoped for from it.

To the statement that it is a cabinet for an armistice of limited duration, I can respond by stating that there is nothing wrong with that. If it realizes some security during the coming period that will of necessity bring about the greatest of challenges for us Lebanese. We will either put this armistice period to use in the positive sense, in order to build a permanent peace in our regions on it, or we will fail to do so, and the fault will be ours.

11887

CSO: 4404/508

GOVERNMENT SEEN TO BE CAUGHT BETWEEN FIGHTING, DISCUSSION

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1436, 11 May 84 p 19

[Article by 'Izzat Safi: "A 'Coup' Government!"]

[Text] The 10-man government came into being as if it were the daughter of Lausanne instead of the hour when it was born. The most important thing about it was not its composition, but its authorization, especially with Rashid Karami as prime minister. Prime Minister Karami and former Prime Minister Salim al-Huss are two political personalities under whose names the Lebanese Front has underlined in red. They are both in the same cabinet, along with a former speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, who has called for a revolution against the Israeli occupation. He is former Speaker 'Adil 'Usayran. There are also two political fighters, Walid Junblatt and Nabih Birri. This front within the government is facing another front, which contains former President Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. Some also count the president of the republic as a member of this front.

In the words of the analysts, this means that the war has moved from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

However, from now on, many will fear this government. Many are also betting that it will produce more clashes than mutual understanding.

What might keep everyone from reaching the danger point quickly is the belief, nay, the certainty, that it will not be possible to form any government after this one, if it is lost due to irritation.

The break-up may be delayed by the fact that Prime Minister Karami is considered the best long-term balance valve around. Even if he is prevented from working within the government as a whole, he can turn to working on another level in another way. This matter is now being taken into consideration in all seriousness. Precise attention is being paid to it. Unlike the other prime ministers. Prime Minister Karami is the head of a cabinet. He has experience, and his positions have had well known results.

In this regard, it is possible that Prime Minister Karami's strength will work in the interest of the government and the cabinet. He is a political and popular leader who can transfer his leadership base from Tripoli to Beirut or Sayda', especially under these circumstances, when there is a need.

Because he is a financier, economist, and planner, in addition to being a politician, he wanted to put all the stages of the government on paper, for at least a year, before agreeing to bear the responsibility along with the group that supports him.

Indeed, some persons who are well informed about the details state that the discussion dealt with the basic structure of the ministerial statement before touching on the distribution of the portfolios and the names of the ministers. Indeed, a long discussion was held on the introduction to the ministerial statement and the question of whether it should be merely a few traditional, concord-filled paragraphs or an introduction of glad tidings for the Lebanese that would announce the end of the fighting and the transition to rebuilding their shattered unity and repairing their institutions, possessions, and livelihoods. In the end, Prime Minister Karami insisted that the introduction contain an announcement that the fighting was over, not a declaration that a cease-fire was in place.

First it was necessary to map out the road of salvation from the crisis and define the stages through which the country would pass on the road. On this bases, agreement was reached in principle on two stages.

Some called the first stage "transitional", while others called it "experimental".

The second stage was called a stage of "reform" by some, while others called it a stage of "change".

In the transitional stage, as we have understood it, the country's affairs will be returned to a natural state. That is, essential reforms will be carried out. This stage will begin as soon as the new government is granted exceptional, expanded authority by the Chamber of Deputies. This authority will allow it to legislate and issue decrees in all administrative, economic, financial, social, educational, military, and electoral fields.

If the government gains this authority, its first move will be to issue a decree increasing the number of deputies from 120 to 126 or 132. It will then issue a decree appointing deputies to replace those whose seats have been emptied by death. In addition, it will appoint deputies who will increase the representation of the sects in accordance with the relative distribution of each sect. This will be done according to the established rule.

In this way, as quickly as possible, the country will get an expanded Chamber of Deputies in which the desired representation will be assured. New faces will be seen in the Chamber. Both the government and the people

will be spared the result of holding public parliamentary elections. The game of representation and legislation will be largely back on course, following the addition of about 30 new deputies, who will make up a quarter of the Chamber's membership.

The new government will face the military problem in the country. This matter, nay, this problem, is considered to be one of the most difficult issues to be thrown on the carpet of political discussion in recent years. This is especially true with regard to the army's tasks on the level of internal security. Positions have been taken and demands made that call for the army to be returned to the barracks, as was decided at the Lausanne conference. In addition, there is an on-going discussion concerning decree number 10 and the authority of the Supreme Defense Council, whose activities have been suspended since a number of its members were sent abroad as military attaches.

It would have been possible to solve the military problem in all its complexity without arousing reactions, had the ministerial council charged with overseeing the reorganization of the army included the basic ministers in the new cabinet. It was agreed at the Lausanne conference to form the committee. It is well known that it must include the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, finance, and interior affairs, under the chairmanship of the president of the republic. On this basis, Walid Junblatt and Nabih Birri are left outside the committee. This gap was one of the main reasons that caused Nabih Birri to decline to join the government and urgently protest its formation.

However, the balance valve, Prime Minister Rashid Karami, moved to suggest a quick solution to this problem. The suggestion calls for decree number 10 to be abolished as soon as the government obtains the exceptional authority it desires. Then the ministers of the new government will all be made members of a higher defense council.

As a quick, temporary measure, Karami promised that the defense council would not hold any meetings until the rectifying decrees were issued.

Though decree number 10, which has to do with the army, is the most prominent project on the agenda of serious political discussions, other legislative decrees issued by the government of Prime Minister al-Wazzan have begun to be placed in the big file that will be opened before the government of Prime Minister Karami.

In addition to the legislative decrees, there are the appointments to important positions. These are referred to as "symbols" in each administration. The process of cancelling these appointments, which were begun in October 1982, was made a condition for the agreement to form the new government. In reality, this operation, which has been agreed to, has begun.

The general director of public security, Mr Zahi al-Bustani, has resigned, and Dr Jamil Ni'mah has been appointed in his place as a proxy. Then Dr Wadi' Haddad, the advisor to the president of the republic on national security affairs, resigned. He was considered to be more important than a minister in the state. He was also described as the "engineer" of relations between Lebanon and the United States of America. In addition, he was described as the number two man in the process that produced the 17 May accord, right after the American envoy, Mr Phillip Habib.

In the area of diplomatic affairs, it is interesting to note that in the new government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been given to Prime Minister Rashid Karami. This is an unusual phenomenon with respect to all the governments previously formed by Karami. He always has insisted on keeping the Ministry of Finance, in addition to being prime minister, no matter what the number of ministers was or how diverse the ministerial portfolios were. It is well known that the Ministry of Finance is the narrow bottleneck through which every decision, decree, and law must pass. It is an "open, observing eye" that lies in wait for each measure, investigates and probes it, and then either rejects it or allows it to pass. Perhaps this is why former President Camille Sham'un accepted the Ministry of Finance.

According to some notable figures in the new government, Lebanon fell victim to the predicament of 17 May because of improvisation and political myopia. In addition, there was only weak opposition to the false American enticements, which led the country into a plight it would not have suffered, had there been a foreign minister well schooled in the politics of the Arab region, who was committed to its rules and principles and knew both the pitfalls of the American policy and how they were to be avoided.

Thus, the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been given to Prime Minister Karami has been considered to be tantamount to an upset in Lebanon's Arab and international policy. It is a reversal with clear characteristics and goals, and it is seen as a desirable development in all the Arab capitals. Moreover, it seems to be seen as permissible in several foreign capitals.

One of the ministers, who is seen as a "pillar" of the government, told AL-HAWADITH that a reversal on this level had to come as a surprise or shock, even to the ministers themselves. It would be unreasonable and impossible for this kind of change to come about via consultation and prior understanding with the new ministers. Therefore, in the statement announcing the new government, Prime Minister Karami explicitly told everyone that, "We feel the same aspirations as the citizens, and we share their desire for a speedy announcement of the formation of the new government. The same is true with respect to the ministers, none of whose advice we have sought."

It is said that the transition stage has begun. It is supposed to last at least a year, during which domestic conditions will be rectified. It will be a period for testing both intentions and actions. At the

same time, the Constituent commission will be set up. According to the Lausanne agreement, it will have 32 members. The commission will draw up the new draft constitution. This will mean the establishment of the second Lebanese republic, which will be oriented toward the elimination of political sectarianism on all levels. Is this possible?

Those with experience and vision expect a long year of struggle. No one knows what the result will be or what Lebanon's fate will be. The strings of the game are not now and will not be in the hands of this government alone!

12224

CSO: 4404/484

NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY OFFICER HOPES FOR END OF WAR

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 57, 12 May 84 pp 18-19

[Interview with Marun Hilu, an important deputy of Camille Sham'un, by Joseph Qasifi: "Those Who Demand the Elimination of Political Sectarianism Are Themselves Sectarian Leaders"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Now secretary of internal affairs in the National Liberal Party, Engineer Marun Hilu has made his way quickly and steadily. He went from the presidency of the party's student organization to the world of politics, whose risks he has assumed with a modern, open outlook and the experience of a professional. At the same time, he has not lost touch with the basic principles he grew up on. Thus, despite changing circumstances, he has continue to preserve good and firm ties with various factions, because he is not afraid of dialogue.

Former President Camille Sham'un is still in very dismal and delicate circumstances. The former president has made Hilu one of his inner circle and trusted him. He has given him delicate and difficult assignments. He has sent Hilu to represent him at meetings and conferences. Most recently, Hilu was a member of the National Liberal delegation at the Geneva conference and the Lausanne conference, where the fate of Lebanon was at stake and the regime was on the operating table.

In his interview with AL-TADAMUN, Hilu said he thought that the 1943 formula was a thing of the past, and that Lebanon was currently experiencing a state of truce. He called for the truce to be developed, so that the war might be ended.

He had this to say in response to those who demand the elimination of political sectarianism: "Those who demand the elimination of political sectarianism are themselves sectarian leaders who have gained power by force of arms."

He said that relations with the Lebanese Phalange were good. He said they should be deepened so as to develop from an alliance based on general principles and distinguished relations between former President Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil to one with a common program, just as happens in the advance democratic countries.

AL-TADAMUN put the following question to Engineer Hilu:

[Question] There has been a lot of talk about the constituent commission. Some condemn it to failure ahead of time. They think it is not serious, and that its activities can produce no result worth mentioning. How do you respond?

[Answer] My response is that the commission is serious. One supposes that it will produce a result. The gulf between the Lebanese is large. The existing alliances have deep roots. Over time, the armed presence has created a divergence in Lebanese society, both in terms of thinking and in terms of how one looks at the future of Lebanon and the continuation of its existence. These differences cannot be healed by a conference, or even by several. They require not a superficial solution, but a fundamental one. Such a solution requires study by specialists and technicians, in order for a new "national pact" to be drawn up. The 1943 National Pact is a thing of the past. The Lausanne conference and the discussions that took place there showed that it cannot continue. Therefore, the old formula has been buried. No matter how we try to revive and beautify it, it cannot form a framework for coexistence among the Lebanese.

Some groups are charging fraud; they are demanding changes and reforms. They want this situation to end, so that they can enjoy all their rights. On the other hand, there are groups that fear that this desired change will come at the expense of their continued freedom and the distinctness of their identity. This reinforces their fear of any reform that does not take into consideration this aspect of things. Therefore, let the problems be aired frankly, clearly, and deeply. The specialists must labor to produce a new formula for Lebanon that will take into account all the variables, thoughts, fears, and hopes, which dominate all the sectarian groups in Lebanon.

[Question] Today you affirm the existence of a Lebanese dispute at the core of the matter whose intensity was heightened partly by foreign elements. However, the Lebanese Front has stated before that the war in Lebanon was caused by the presence of armed foreigners. It said that the removal of this presence would immediately restore unity to the Lebanese. Recent events have shown the opposite to be the case. What do you say?

[Answer] The position taken by the Lebanese Front on the war was not tactical. The foreign factor did help the crisis to explode. If it had not been for the arms in the hands of the Palestinians, the struggle would not have been an armed struggle. The dissemination of arms among the Lebanese, which was the work of the Palestinian resistance, transferred the conflict from the political realm to the military realm. The same factor helped to deepen the abyss among the Lebanese and encouraged extremist elements to grow and demand things by force of arms that were not at the root of the conflict. This process of making demands began to escalate. It accompanied the escalating spread of arms and created a certain atmosphere of internal decay.

Thus, we return to the statement that were it not for the foreign element, the situation would not have exploded as it did.

The secretary for internal affairs in the National Liberal Party went on to say the following:

All the groups have domestic demands. One can deal with these demands within established political frameworks. These demands have not taken the form of a revolution against the system and the government. The armed foreign element intervened and sympathized with certain Lebanese Factions. This caused other factions to reject their mode of behavior, which posed a threat to the very structure of the nation. All the problems were caused by the continued action of the foreign factors. This method must be rejected by those responsible for studying all the problems through dialogue and the creation of appropriate solutions to them.

[Question] At the Lausanne conference, it became clear that two different kinds of logic were tugging at the conferees: the logic of the supremacy of the principle of democracy, which rests on true participation (pluralism), and the logic of the supremacy of the principle of numerical democracy. Is there room for a formula that reconciles these two kinds of logic?

[Answer] The events have definitively shown that no one faction can prevail over the others. Solutions are arrived at by dialogue. The basis of the government in Lebanon is participation by all the sons of this country, so that the Lebanese will be able to live in freedom through such participation, with no single faction tyrannizing another. These principles are basic to the existence of the entity of Lebanon. As for the formulas for translating these principles into reality, they are numerous. The important thing is to have good intentions. The factions should have no hidden intentions, because any agreement that is not based on sound intentions will not long endure. The desirable thing at this point is for the Lebanese to concentrate on working out a fundamental solution to the problem of participation.

[Question] Some factions charge that when you put forward the principle of "comprehensive secularism" in response to the elimination of political sectarianism, you are merely engaging in a maneuver. They say you do not actually believe in what you are suggesting, because it conflicts with the true interests of the Lebanese Front.

[Answer] When a party or a front turns its gaze to the future of Lebanon, it does not maneuver. It is proper to maneuver when one is facing simple matters. However, it is impossible to maneuver with regard to political matters of a critical nature. This society has become a sectarian society. Those who demand the elimination of political sectarianism are sectarian leaders who have assumed leadership of their sects by force of arms. Does not this contain the core of the contradiction?

If political sectarianism is eliminated in the manner proposed by those calling for this change, this will mean nothing but the hegemony of one sect over another. This is inconsistent with the basic principles I have

cited, and which are the cause of Lebanon's existence. We must look for a new formula for coexistence among the sects. If we think that this society is pluralistic, then we must practically translate this perception into a formula for the future. This formula has succeeded in all pluralistic societies. We cannot find a single composite country in which there is an artificial, unitary formula. Among the countries that exemplify the success of composite formulas in composite societies are Switzerland and Yugoslavia.

[Question] In a recent lecture, Fadi Ifram, the commander of the Lebanese Forces suggested political and security decentralization. What do you think about it?

[Answer] All these suggestions express the sectarian situation we are experiencing. We must preserve this situation through a confederal formula. However, so far no one has put forward an integrated and final proposal. Perhaps it will be different with the specialists the Lebanese Phalange Party and the National Liberal Party will choose to study a detailed confederal proposal.

[Question] How do you view relations between the Phalange Party and the National Liberal Party? How much cooperation was there between the delegations from the two parties at Lausanne?

[Answer] At Lausanne, there was complete harmony. There was continuous coordination between the two pillars of the Lebanese Front (former President Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil), as well as between their aides and advisors, of course. Their proposals were unified. On the basis of this experience, we must deepen the alliance and give it a broader, more comprehensive content than that found in its current, superficial form and in the excellent personal relationship that exists between the two pillars of the front. This requires cooperative effort and a single plan. This is how alliances are between all the parties in the democratic countries. An alliance must be based on a program, just as a dispute must be based on one. The parties, especially the Phalange and the National Liberals, must modernize their alliance frameworks and work seriously and practically to deepen this alliance.

[Question] Will the Lebanese-Syrian summit, which has brought President Amin al-Jumayyil and President Hafiz al-Asad together for the first time, produce a peace or a truce?

[Answer] The regional situation demands a truce. The internal forces want one as well, because all the Lebanese have grown tired of this war. The economic situation has deteriorated to the point where bankruptcy threatens all levels of society. We hope that all parties will have sincere intentions, for they must bear their responsibilities and save the country. What we are witnessing today is a truce, but we can develop it so as to end the war, if the government and the factions can manage to work sincerely and look to the interest of their country and their people.

[Question] Some fear that the Israeli factor will intervene to sabotage the truce and nullify the results of the summit.

[Answer] The Lebanese side must deal with the problem it has with Israel, especially now that the 17 May 1983 agreement has been cancelled, for some Lebanese lands and regions are being occupied. All possible measures must be taken to negotiate with Israel again on sound foundations that will prevent an explosion.

We were among those who called for the establishment of security measures with Israel before the conclusion of the 17 May accord. We were also among those who called for the agreement to be concluded, because it placed the credibility of the government and the national entity at stake.

As for today, we cannot ignore the real situation. We are in a bad situation from which we must escape. The question of negotiations and how to conduct them is one of the matters the new government must look to, in view of its enormous importance, no matter whether these negotiations are direct or are conducted via the international Security Council or the United States of America.

If the government can find a solution to the problem of the south, it will have prepared the way for ending the war. Otherwise, there will be nothing but a truce, after which the regional struggle will break out again on the ground. This is what we do not want. We want to build a modern country. We want to give Lebanon a formula that will express the situation of the society we want for it: one that assures its members the chance to live in freedom and dignity, in the framework of a country that is finally independent.

[Question] During the 2-years war, you had relations with a number of high-level Syrian officials. Have these relations been renewed with the mutual opening between the Syrians, the government and some factions in the Lebanese Front?

[Answer] No. We took part in the conferences at Geneva and Lausanne because the government invited us. We met with Syrian officials, but there was no move forward.

[Question] Would you accept an invitation to visit Syria?

[Answer] It depends on the circumstances...

[Question] Are you trying to restore relations between former President Camille Sham'un and the Syrians?

[Answer] Absolutely not.

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SOUTHERN VIEWS ON RESOLUTION OF CIVIL CONFLICT CONSIDERED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1438, 25 May 84 pp 13, 14

[Article by A.S.: "In a Frank Conversation on Lebanon, Edmond Rizq Calls for the Alternative of Government Credibility: Trust Is Not a Tax the Chamber Pays!"]

[Text] The former minister and deputy from the south, Edmond Rizq, is betting on many hopes that hang on the salvation of Lebanon.

In every conversation held with him at the headquarters of his temporary stay in Paris, he calls for rebellion, indeed revolution, against the situation that is tearing Lebanon apart. He calls on the leaders of the dialogue who have participated in the government to choose between imposing their decrees on the combatants or withdrawing and leaving the stage to people who are in a position of real power to embark on the salvation and impose their decrees.

Deputy Rizq asserts that Lebanon's sole and only salvation lies in the unity of its people and a secular regime, which will impose itself on the Lebanese whatever time that might take.

Deputy Rizq said much in his meeting with AL-HAWADITH.

AL-HAWADITH: Let us start with the point Lebanon has reached today. A government has been formed, a ministerial statement is on its way to the Chamber of Deputies and they will work to grant or withhold confidence from the cabinet. The question is, will you once again play your part as a deputy, and where do you stand regarding the new experiment, in terms of loyalty and opposition?

Edmond Rizq: It is certain that I will return to Lebanon, because I have not become an expatriate, have not emigrated and have not chosen exile; although there are reasons which have driven me into a temporary absence, and although they still exist, they cannot make me extend the period of absence. I will be returning to Beirut, to Jazzin and to the south, as I wrote in my latest article in AL-HAWADITH, because I believe in confrontation on the ground and in taking a position which will give the person who holds it credibility.

I am not now in the ranks of the opposition or the loyalists. Rather, I am holding to a position of rejection, a position of will and a position of aspiration.

I reject, as I have been rejecting since 1975, everything that has gone on and is going on in Lebanon, at the hands of most of the prominent groups on the stage, who are continuing the confrontation.

I reject killing, I reject crime, I reject this fragmentation among the people, I reject the state of geographical wastage and internal division that the foreign parties are carrying out on Lebanese territory, and I also reject the removal of parts of the country by citizens and Lebanese groups, whatever these groups might be, because any Lebanese, from any group, any party, any organization, any militia, who puts his hand on Lebanese territory, sets it apart from the other areas, and removes the hand of the legitimate government from it is in my opinion a usurper just like an occupying foreigner. The usurper and the occupier, in my opinion, are the same.

We want to rebuild and repair everything the war has destroyed in the context of the Lebanese will, in eliminating the effects of other people's wars, but our rejection of what is going on is not enough by itself; it is mandatory that we move, because Lebanon's salvation cannot occur by waiting or by capitulating.

There is the ambitious position which tempts many Lebanese, that of playing a positive and practical role in order to save Lebanon. That is what I feel today -- that I, along with others, have a role which we must play and must not shrink from. This role starts by acknowledging reality and acknowledging the truth and by sacrificing oneself for the sake of what we consider to be Lebanon's higher interests.

AL-HAWADITH: Do you consider the formation of the cabinet the start of change and transformation, or just a passing truce?

Edmond Rizq: For the first time, I feel what every Lebanese feels, that is, the need for salvation, because we can no longer bear the continuation of this wretched situation. Therefore the position of principle which I have taken on the formation of the cabinet is to agree to give it a chance, and I have announced that. However, it would be intellectual stupidity for us to rush headlong with hopes, without analyzing probabilities.

This cabinet was composed under compulsion, under circumstances of coercion. It was composed of bitter mutual enemies, not just on the emotional level but on the corporal and material level, since they have tried to liquidate one another and physically eliminate one another. It is the failure of each of the groups in the cabinet to liquidate the other that caused it to agree to participate in this cabinet.

If any of the groups had been able to take exclusive power, or be the only one in power, it would not have been willing to have any of the groups as its partner.

They came to this government not just against the people's will, but under coercion, themselves, specifically. That is not the cabinet which in my view can move Lebanon from its wretched past and its miserable present to a happy future.

First of all, if there is responsibility for the condition Lebanon has reached, that lies on the necks of the central figures in this cabinet and the groups in it, because they all have taken part since 1943 in one way or another in Lebanese policy, and have been influential. If the regime, since the initial era of independence, has been deficient in reform, they are the people who have been deficient, if the regime has refrained from making any progress, they are the ones who have been backward, and if the regime has been corrupt, they are the people who are responsible for this corruption.

Nonetheless, I can say that they are entitled to a chance, still, and I give them this chance.

AL-HAWADITH: To prove their failure?

Edmond Rizq: Not to prove their failure, but to try to make up and atone for what they have inflicted on Lebanon.

I do not want to derogate anyone, or rejoice over anyone's misfortune. I hope that these gentlemen will succeed in restoring security and confidence to Lebanon, so that I can be the first wellwisher and the first person to seek forgiveness. Almighty God alone is the one who gives forgiveness, in any case.

AL-HAWADITH: We know that the people who have followed one another in power since 1943 are the people of the regime; they are the regime itself. If a state of despair exists over their ability to bring about salvation, that means that a state of despair exists over the regime. Are you condemning the regime through your condemnation of the people in it?

Edmond Rizq: I said that we are all in a state of coercion, compulsion and constraint, and therefore if we were to choose and make decisions, we would not return the ball, and would not reiterate the experiment. However, as long as they are here, we will give them a chance, out of kindness to the people, out of kindness to the country, and out of kindness to them, so that it will not be said that they have not been given a chance to make up for what they committed or failed to do.

As regards the regime, I still said that the stipulations we have are among the best in the world, whether those are the constitution, the laws, or the principles of the government. They have not been divinely revealed, in any case. They can change and be amended, but I would like to call to mind a statement by the second teacher, the philosopher al-Farabi, when he said that if people honor cold water and die, that does not change it[s nature].

The regime and the stipulations are the cold water, and the people in the regime are the ones who have honored it and have not changed the nature of the water; rather, by bottling the water and having a monopoly over it,

through the "greed" they have devoted to the water, they have honored the water and have died.

I do not want to defend stipulations, but I do not want to attack them and find people innocent. It is people who carry out provisions. Paul the Apostle says that words kill but the spirit revives.

Living people can even revive dead words, but dead people cannot kill living words; rather, it is they who have died, and it is the word and the statement which was at the beginning.

The regime is a principle, and the people of the regime are the ones who are to be found guilty.

AL-HAWADITH: If the cabinet experiment fails, what is the solution and what possible alternatives are there to bring about salvation?

Edmond Rizq: This cabinet has been formed and was given a legal character from the moment its decrees were issued. It was expected, and supposed, that since its members were the groups involved in the war, most of the groups involved in the war, or were all representatives of groups in the war, that all the manifestations of the war would be stopped. All the acts of bombing, sniping, explosions, cutting off of roads and barriers must be stopped and steps along the road to the restoration of normal life must start. Here we are witnessing more violence and for the first time the bombing involves schoolyards and children are being killed. This means that this cabinet, which is supposed to earn confidence between the time it is formed and the time it appears before the chamber, does not seem to have earned the confidence yet.

This time confidence means something different from what it meant in the ordinary cases when the chamber would give confidence to the cabinets out of kindness to the presidents or as an expression of a sincere desire to facilitate people's tasks. The chambers existed, and on some occasions we would give confidence to cabinets without being favorably convinced over the way they were formed or the contents of their ministerial statements, because the ministerial statements are a declaration of intentions, and did not become true all at once. One should note that they have sometimes been the object of an attempt to bring about the truth.

I am not waiting for this cabinet's ministerial statement before deciding whether or not to give it confidence. However, I am waiting for the acts and deeds that can be attributed to its members and groups so that it will have the right to ask me whether I would give it confidence or not.

This cabinet does not have the right to demand confidence while people are being bombed and the country is being destroyed and terrorized. Rather, and this is a basic condition, it must say "This is what I have done since the decrees on my formation were issued, and this will give you notice that I am determined to do it. Give me confidence on this basis."

However, since the state of war is continuing, that will bring the cabinet down before the confidence session. I am not afraid of a vacuum, and am not offering alternatives now, because I am still hoping that this cabinet will be able to face itself before it faces the chamber, and that the people who are on the east will tell the people who are on the west, and the people on the west the people on the east, "Silence your artillery so that we can go to the Chamber of Deputies." However, for them to ask the chamber for confidence as if it were a tax which it pays out from a position of inferiority means eliminating the last hope in this nation and suppressing the last values of democracy. We are not prepared to give confidence as if it is a tax. They are not the victors so that they should be entitled to the tax, and we are not the defeated ones, although we have been tortured and our country is in pain and wounded, and our people are ground down and oppressed. We refuse to deal as if we were a defeated people and the cabinet were a triumphant victor. In my view, this cabinet can appear before the Chamber of Deputies only if it brings it not a ministerial statement of the sort that is mere ink on paper, but rather accomplishments. I consider that the chamber should meet only if the cabinet has deeply implanted security. The chamber should refuse to meet in such a state, as long as the schools are closed, the airport is closed, business is paralyzed, and going about is out of the question. The chamber must refuse not just to give the cabinet confidence but to review the principle of giving the cabinet confidence or withholding it. The council can do this, and this is a sort of democratic practice in its most advanced manifestations and highest degrees.

AL-HAWADITH: Not to defend the cabinet or the ministers, but don't you believe that we are imposing more on them than they are able to bear, especially since there is an occupying force which rejects reconciliation and seeks to wreck it? The statement by David Kinche is the most recent proof of that; prior to that the war and the conferences on dialogue showed how able the people in the regime and politicians are to impose solutions.

Edmond Rizq: So let them bring in people who can provide a solution.

AL-HAWADITH: Who?

Edmond Rizq: Whoever they may be. Those people came in a blaze of deceit as if they had appeared before people in the form of doers, as people who could make decisions. If they did not, let them be so bold as to take an honorable and frank position and say "We are not competent" instead of claiming that so-and-so is the master of the stage. Let them say, "We are not competent and we are making way for others."

If the logic of force is what brought in this government, let the truly strong come in so that we can see if they want to save this country or not.

However, for people not to be able to come in on grounds that they are competent is what we reject. It is not the time to make appeals or requests for mercy, or for presenting petitions to people who have their fingers on the triggers or are huddling down in artillery and missile bases.

There is no argument that Israel is against this cabinet, because it is the cabinet of the abrogation of the agreement with Israel. However, it would be amazing if Syria were not in favor of this cabinet, because it is the cabinet of "the Syrian option."

I understand that the issue of the south is being deferred to another time, but the problem in reality, today, is not in the south. Many Lebanese may wish that they could find a way to the south, so that they could seek refuge in its artificial security, to escape what is sweeping over the other areas.

The point is not that we should use the presence of the Israeli occupation as an excuse but that we should act in isolation from the actual situation in the south as it is now. I say this shedding tears and bitterness over the situation the south has reached because of dereliction, small-mindedness and a lack of maturity of thinking, analysis and conduct.

AL-HAWADITH: You called on ministers to give way to people who are capable of exerting their responsibilities, if they themselves are not. Would you thus be calling for the government to be handed over to the militias that are competent?

Edmond Rizq: Not exactly and not emphatically. Rather, I have set out possible alternatives, and still hope that the members of this cabinet will exert all their abilities and resources to prove that they really are holding the reins of the groups to which they belong. All of them are the actual heads of the militia which belong to them and are under their patronage. If they are not competent, if the major figures in the Lebanese Front are not able to silence the artillery which is massed in the eastern zone, if the major figures in the Salvation Front are not able to silence the artillery in the mountains and in the western zone, if the regime, with all its elements, is not able to control the positions of the Lebanese Army, and if the Lebanese-Syrian alliance is not able to control the artillery which is on Syrian ammunition and in Syrian positions, with Syrian equipment and materiel, what does this mean? This means that others besides these gentlemen are holding the reins. Let them come forward themselves so that we can see.

They will either fight among themselves and liquidate one another, or they will make peace, and Lebanon, or what remains of Lebanon, and even the Lebanese, will be in peace.

I do not want to ignore international in this regard. I once said that there are two basic players and parties on the Lebanese stage, Syria and Israel, and as long as Lebanon is an arena for the Syrian-Israeli conflict, that means that we will not rest.

I imagine that we are to a large extent the hostages of the outcome of this conflict and the desires of these two parties.

I have also said, time and again, that the cause of the Middle East, that is, the Palestine cause, can be resolved only with Soviet-American cooperation and Palestinian-Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese participation. I also say that the issue of Lebanese security will be solved at this stage only by a

Syrian-Israeli understanding, for everyone knows what he wants from the other, rather than having Lebanon be the goat that various people are feeding while waiting to get what they yearn for.

Most unfortunately, Lebanese policy is deficient in maturity, deficient in wisdom, deficient in farsightedness and deficient in courage. It has brought us to the state where it is the hostage of others. For that reason, if you ask about the road to salvation, I cannot say that there is any, other than unity and mutual understanding among the Lebanese.

AL-HAWADITH: You presented plans before the Lausanne conference that are inclined toward federalism and the cantonal system, an approach which conflicts with the unity that you yourself are calling for. What is your opinion?

Edmond Rizq: I have not read the plan the Lebanese Front is said to have presented in Lausanne, but I cannot be in favor of any plan of that kind.

I believe that history, the history of a people, the history of a nation, and the history of a country, does not begin with a person and does not end with persons. Therefore, people who reach a dead end or the bank of a river but do not have a ladder to go up the wall or a boat to cross the river are not assumed to have to put up a final boundary at the point they have reached. Rather, they must put up a sign stating that there is a wall and that there is a bank, leaving it to others to scale the wall and go over it, and to pass over to the other side of the river.

Though people have become tired of defending the unity of Lebanon, the majority of the Lebanese people are devoting their lives to defending its unity.

Lebanon was a unified country and it was happy with this unity. The events occurred and created new developments which exhausted it and damaged it. Does that mean that it must atone for itself? Let it atone for the people who have brought it to this point. Let Lebanon atone for the reasons and let it atone for the persons, but let it continue to believe in itself. This is a return to faith, destiny and fate.

AL-HAWADITH: Is that a call for revolution?

Edmond Rizq: It is a call for rejection. We today have the duty of rebelling against the state of affairs, and if it is necessary to use the word "revolution," let it be a revolution against oneself, a revolution against this waste. The Lebanese alone are the ones who can save Lebanon. There is no recourse but for our ranks and will to become joined. We had hoped that that would take place at the start of President Ilyas Sarkis' term, but he lost the chance for one reason or another, and perhaps I should not hold him to blame. The opportunity was given, and it was greater than that which was given to President Sarkis or with the election of the late President Bashir al-Jumayyil, with which we were made miserable. Then an opportunity was given, the greatest in 10 years, the day President Amin al-Jumayyil was elected, but it was lost and wasted and it slipped out of our hands, and here we are, returning to a situation that is much worse than the one we were in and

involved with. Perhaps this will keep us from despairing of the possibility that a new chance will be given.

AL-HAWADITH: Let us come back to the first question. What is the alternate solution for salvation? What is the radical solution?

Edmond Rizq: Lebanon has entered a stage of liquidation, the way warehouses liquidate their goods. Lebanon is liquidating its past, is liquidating its pains, so that it can rise up to face the future with vigor and keep abreast of the times -- indeed, go beyond the times. This is not an impulse of youth on Lebanon's part, or a superiority complex.

Rather, it is part of our deep faith, which causes us to transcend the current situation so that we can look out over the future. The future, in my view, cannot be a factional one, and the Lebanon of tomorrow cannot be the Lebanon of [Articles] Six and Six [bis].

The Lebanon of the future cannot be the Lebanon of the minority, the majority or an equal share; rather, it must be the Lebanon of equality, democracy and freedom, and that can be realized only through secularism, a secularism which I have been calling for since the sixties, and which I believed in before I was calling for it, because I studied in the south, in the Jazzin area where there is no discrimination or prejudice between Moslems and Christians, between Druzes and Maronites, and where we are still graced with the sweet memories of Lebanon. This secularism which I embrace and believe in is the remedy, and the solution does not mean a negation of religion or an abandonment of it; rather, it could mean the peak of religious devotion. However, it rejects cliques and rids religion of the character of a passport to [high] positions or a bill of lading for personal interests.

Religion belongs to God, and the truly religious person is the one who knows the principles of his religion and observes them in their essence, not on their surface, observes them in their revealed texts and not in his own theorizing, which is inspired by personal interests.

I believe that Lebanon will become united in a civilized secular system which will strengthen religious devotion when it is built and will eliminate matters that cause fragmentation.

If the Moslem returns to his Koran, the Christian returns to his New Testament and the Druze returns to his wisdom and approved customs, and if each of us returns to his book:

If that happens, not a single fanatic will remain among us, nor will a dispute over surface matters arise among us; rather, we will all put our affairs in order and rise up to perform our mission in our Arab environment and the broad world.

BRIEFS

MARKETING AL-BIQA' PRODUCE--Ways of marketing the agricultural products of the Al-Biqa' were considered today during a meeting held by senior local officials and prominent figures of the agricultural sector. The head of the Union of Farmers reported on his recent visit in Jordan and on his meeting with the Lebanese ambassador in Amman, at which he discussed the extent of damage already sustained by the Lebanese economy. The Lebanese Ambassador [to Jordan], Samir Hubayqah, later met with the Jordanian minister of agriculture to discuss the possible entry of Lebanese products to the Jordanian market. He also met for the same purpose with senior Jordanian marketing officials. One possibility considered at the meeting today was the use of the Riyaq military airbase to airlift Lebanese products to Arab markets. The European Community has also been contacted by the authorities to secure approval for the importing of Lebanese products. [Text] [NC091448 Beirut Domestic Service in English 1405 GMT 9 Jun 84]

RESPONSE TO ISLAMIC GROUPING--Na'um Farah, the official spokesman for the Lebanese Forces Command, has said that the Islamic grouping's statement yesterday told the truth, though it contained traditional accusations. The official spokesman commended the boldness that was demonstrated by the conferees at the mufti's office yesterday and their admission concerning the laxness of security in West Beirut. The conferees, according to the spokesman, called on the Muslims to withdraw all the heavy weapons from residential areas and to remove the rocket launchers from the streets between the houses. The spokesman added that this was a sincere admission and clearcut accusation against those who claim to be defending the security of West Beirut and that of the Muslims by shelling the Christian areas. Farah added: We can tell the conjerees of the Islamic grouping meeting that those who benefit from the shelling and the continuation of the explosive situation are those who dictate conditions to the deputies and civilians through the logic of cannons. But as for the accusations that were levelled against the Lebanese Forces, the Lebanese Front, and the Army, these were expected from the conferees as such accusations are part of their traditional policy. During the past 8 years--while in the service of the Palestinians--they levelled accusations against Bashir al-Jumayyil and referred to us as the isolationist ghetto. Farah continued: We can understand the objective behind their present accusations against the Lebanese Forces. [Text] [NC141742 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1615 GMT 14 Jun 84]

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

GREEK TRAINING PALACE GUARDS--"Coupist" Paraskevas Bolaris, a major dismissed from the service and an escapee, is living in Saudi Arabia, where he is training the 200 men of the palace guard. This was reported yesterday by the THESSALONIKI newspaper, which did not reveal its source. The paper writes that "Bolaris has settled in Riyad, where he has been granted honors by the Saudi Arabian regime." It adds that other well-known torturers from the dictatorial period are also in Saudi Arabia, and it names one of them, Konstandinos Karapanagiotis. According to the paper, these juntist individuals were put in touch with the Saudi Arabian regime by a "Greek shipowner who has secured a number of building contracts" in that country. [Text] [Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 23 Jun 84 p 4]

CSO: 3521/291

SYRIA

SUPPORT URGED FOR KARAMI'S GOVERNMENT

JN111017 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0345 GMT 11 Jun 84

[Report from the press review,

[Text] In its commentary today, AL-BA'TH says: The Lebanese Government is expected to win the Chamber of Deputies' confidence this week when the discussion of its statement of policy is completed. When we assume that this government, which has pledged to shoulder national and pan-Arab responsibilities that fulfill the aspirations of the Lebanese people's majority, will win confidence, our assumption is not based on the fact that there is wagering on this confidence. This is particularly so since we believe that whoever refrains from voting confidence to Karami's national reconciliation government is actually doing so outside the national framework, and consequently, are actually expressing loyalty to all those who harbor evil toward Lebanon. Thus, the problem is not the wager on confidence: The problem is, and has been for the 40 days since the cabinet's formation, the continuation of wagering on the Israeli role in Lebanon. Those following the course of events since the formation of Karami's cabinet will realize the extent and objectives of the continuing attempts of those obstructing the course of reconciliation through delay, destabilization of the security situation, kidnapping, and sniping in order to create an atmosphere of fear and instability following the state of stability which was achieved after the formation of Karami's government.

AL-BA'TH adds: The government of national reconciliation is certainly not required to perform miracles in such a short time, but we are almost certain that this government is capable of performing the duties entrusted to it and for which it was formed. To enable this government to achieve its objectives, several conditions must be made available--foremost of which is the need to express fealty to the homeland overtly and covertly through real action--particularly since the age of the Byzantine argument, which was adopted by the majority of the Lebanese politicians, has gone. This Byzantine argument was used by these politicians as a means of procrastinating and running away from reality and historical fact.

Under the government of national unity, Lebanon now is heading toward salvation from a tragedy that almost wiped it out. Thus, is it not high time for all those loyal to Lebanon, whether they are ministers, deputies,

politicians, or citizens to close ranks and support the government to enable it to pursue the march of salvation that Lebanon greatly needs?

AL-BA'TH concludes: If we assume that there are good intentions, and if we begin from the premise of loyalty to Lebanon as an Arab country that is resisting the Zionist occupation, the march of salvation must begin as quickly as possible. On the other hand, if the intentions of some Lebanese parties are different from those above, they will certainly, in one way or another, converge with the new attempt proposed by Israel yesterday--namely, the attempt to partition Lebanon through isolating forces in the Al-Biqa'. This attempt was rejected by the UN secretary general on behalf of the world community. Can we take this as a lesson? Is Perez de Cuellar more concerned about Lebanon's unity than some of the Lebanese citizens?

CSO: 4400/279

AL-THAWRAH WARNS OF AGGRAVATING LEBANON'S SECURITY

JN140807 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0345 GMT 14 Jun 84

[Report from the press review]

[Text] In its editorial, AL-THAWRAH notes the statements made by Zionist agent Fadi Afram, commander of the so-called Lebanese Forces, after his meeting with a number of Zionist organizations' leaders in the United States. The paper asserts that these statements coincided with Israeli agents' moves to aggravate the Lebanese situation and to prevent the national government from reaping the gains of the new stage that began when it won a vote of confidence from the Chamber of Deputies.

The paper adds: It is obvious that these moves will not achieve their wicked aims, because the march of national accord--which has begun in Lebanon--will not stop or collapse. Everybody, primarily Israel's agents, must realize this fact.

AL-THAWRAH continues: The emergence of a new Lebanon has become the fate of all Lebanese. The agent minority which moves in the homeland in an attempt to annul the will of a whole people will only achieve disappointment and complete failure. This is because this minority will ultimately find itself outside all circles and calculations.

AL-THAWRAH concludes: The small agents in Lebanon such as Fadi Afram and others cannot change the new formula in the Lebanese arena. These agents must know full well that their terrorist attempts will return to whence they come, because these attempts will have catastrophic consequences for the agents. The submission agreement collapsed; Israel's role in Lebanon ended forever; and the march of national accord has become the main slogan of the new stage in Lebanon. Israel's agents must realize these facts and dimensions. They must also adapt themselves to these facts and dimensions. If these agents cannot do so, they must leave Lebanon, because that country only has room for honorable and nationalist people.

CSO: 4400/279

SURPLUS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DROPS IN 1983

GF281136 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 28 Jun 84 p 19

["Business" column by Francis Matthew: "Dh500 Million Surplus in UAE Balance of Payments"]

[Text] The UAE balance of payments was Dh550 million in surplus in 1983 which was down from a surplus of Dh6,000 million in 1982. This reflects the downturn in oil sales but also the basically sound position of the UAE's economy as the balance of payments has stayed in surplus.

The total public deficit of the unified accounts of all the emirates and the federal government was Dh5,520 million, which was a 112 per cent increase over the 1982 deficit of Dh2,603 million.

Federal expenditure in 1983 was Dh1,622 million, which meant a federal deficit of Dh183 million. Dh14,745 million from the federal spending went to current expenditure and the rest to development expenditure.

These are some of the key facts presented in the latest Central Bank bulletin which outlines for the first time the balance of payments and public expenditure results for 1983.

The balance of payments is the vital indicator of the wealth of the UAE and shows how the basic wealth of the country is coping with buying the needs of a developing nation.

In 1983 the downturn in oil and gas sales, are shown. Oil exports were worth Dh42 billion compared with Dh53.1 billion in 1982, and gas exports were worth Dh5 billion compared with Dh5.5 billion in 1982.

Other exports and re-exports increased from Dh8.3 billion in 1982 to Dh9.5 billion, which meant the total exports in 1983 were worth Dh56.5 billion compared with Dh66.9 billion in 1982.

Total exports in 1983 cost Dh33 billion which combined with services and private remittances give a total of Dh39.8 billion, resulting in a current account surplus of Dh16.7 billion for 1983.

The Dh33 billion imports are only Dh1 billion less than the 1982 figure of Dh34 billion, which reflects the continuing demand for development materials in the UAE, particularly capital intensive oil field development which is continuing.

Bankers and other observers of the economic scene contacted yesterday by KHALEEJ TIMES said that while consumer demand was falling, particularly for household goods and some foodstuffs, the oil field developments would be enough to keep the import figure steady especially when combined with the continuing building of infrastructure, mainly in Abu Dhabi.

The current account surplus of Dh16.7 billion is combined with capital expenditure of Dh16.15 billion to produce the balance of payments overall surplus of Dh650 million for 1983.

The capital account included official loans outside the country, private capital outside the country, and error. (See table of balance of payments details.)

The synopsis of all public finance in the UAE, combining the spending of all the emirates and the federal government shows the deficit to have increased from Dh2,603 million in 1982 to Dh5,520 million in 1983, which is an increase of 112 per cent.

In 1983 total public expenditure was Dh37,871 million, down 10.3 per cent from the Dh42,231 million in 1982. The revenue was Dh32,350 million in 1983 giving the Dh5,520 million deficit.

Revenue was drawn from oil earnings to the tune of 83.5 per cent in 1983 and 87.4 per cent in 1982. This fall in percentage and overall total reflects the cuts in income the emirates have had to take due to the slack oil market.

This trend is visible in all the AGCC countries and has been the subject of joint and separate efforts to increase sales, and is sure to be at the top of the agenda in Vienna next month at the OPEC meeting.

Public expenditure was divided between current expenditure (63.7 per cent), development expenditure (17.9 per cent), and investment and capital expenditure (18.4 per cent), out of the total of Dh37,871 million.

All of these categories were cut from the year before. Total expenditure was down 10.3 per cent current expenditure 7.7 per cent, development expenditure 23.8 per cent, and investment and capital expenditure down 3.2 per cent.

The largest cut was in the development expenditure which went down from Dh8,931 million in 1982 to Dh6,801 million in 1983.

In the investment and capital expenditure category there is a breakdown of the agriculture, industry and electricity, transport and communications, municipalities and housing elements. Of all these only agriculture has been increased.

This is a measure of the government's concern to expand the agricultural sector and to try and increase self production of food. It is also a measure of the capital intensive types of farming which is flourishing in the UAE, requiring substantial funds. (See table of public finance details)

The federal government drew Dh13,699 million from the contributing emirates, which combined with its other earnings gave it an income of Dh14,393 million.

When compared with the combined public income of Dh3,235 million, the federal income is small and this indicates the extent to which the individual emirates fund their own projects and projects in other emirates.

UAE Balance of Payments 1983 and 1982 (in billion Dirhams)

	1983	1982
Oil exports	42	53.1
Gas exports	5	5.5
Other exports and re-exports	9.5	8.3
Total exports	56.5	66.9
Total imports CIF [Central Information File]	33	34
Service and private remittances	5.5	4.8
Official aid	1.3	2.4
Current account balance	16.7	25.7
Capital account	16.15	19.7
Official loans	3.06	3.7
Official capital	.43	.2
Private capital and error	12.66	15.8
Total surplus	.55	.6
Foreign assets of financial institutions	1.49	3.5
Government organisations	.2	2.4
To IMF	.04	.1

Synopsis of unified account of public finance in the UAE (Including the finances of all emirates and the federal government) (in million Dirhams)

	1983 total	per cent	per cent change over 1982
Public revenue	32,350.6	100	- 18.4
Oil revenue	27,006.1	83.5	- 22.1
Public expenditure	37,871.4	100	- 10.3
Current expenditure	24,133	63.7	- 7.7
Development expenditure	6,801.6	17.9	- 23.8
Agriculture	349.2	.9	+ 10.5
Industry and electricity	1,544	4.1	- 24.2
Transport and communications	1,545.6	4.1	- 29.8
Municipalities	1,670.8	4.4	- 13.2
Housing	555.8	1.5	- 43.2
Investment and capital spending	6,956.8	18.4	- 3.2
Deficit	5,520.8		+112.1

Source: Central Bank bulletin

IRP ORGAN RECOMMENDS U.S. SHOULD THINK TWICE BEFORE ACTING

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 9 Jun 84 pp 1, 12

[Text] In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. The struggle against the United States is nothing new to the Muslim, revolutionary nation of Iran. This great and resisting nation has confronted the great satan in various ways for 22 years. As history testifies, this nation has delivered a great slap in the face of that plundering demon.

Now that the crisis in the Persian Gulf region has entered a new phase due to the daily increasing mischief of the United States, the Iranian nation is once again ready to throw its force into the teeth of the great satan and teach him another lesson. If the lessons of 5 June 1963 and 8 September 1978 and 11 February 1979 and Tabas were not sufficient, and if the Lebanese lesson did not teach the necessary facts to the United States, then there is no harm done if it tests its strength with revolutionary Muslims so that they can teach it an even bigger lesson.

Although the provocations of the great satan in the Persian Gulf are not unconnected with Lebanese problems and the upcoming presidential elections in the United States, that which is encouraging Reagan and his terrorist bank to intensify these provocations is mistaken analysis which the analysts of the spy agencies affiliated with the satanic powers are providing to the White House's occupants. Once again Washington is getting itself into trouble through its misplaced reliance on the weak minds and flawed intelligence of western analysts, including those of the CIA, without correctly evaluating the probable reaction of the region's Muslim nations and the level of readiness in the revolutionary nation of Iran to confront the plots. If U.S. authorities thought about the consequences with any precision, they would never be prepared to get themselves in such trouble.

In its evaluation of the Persian Gulf situation, Washington has relied on the confidences the region's reactionary rulers have given the Pentagon, while it does not have the slightest knowledge about the situation of the region's peoples, their viewpoints, and their reaction to U.S. provocations and aggressions. The intelligence which the White House's occupants have about the situation inside Iran is provided solely through counter-revolutionary channels. These counterrevolutionaries see everything the way they want to, and are always prepared to give false hopes to their masters. In the analyses of the spy agencies feeding the White House

there is no correct information whatsoever about the level of readiness in the Iranian nation to defend the Islamic revolution and confront foreign aggressions, particularly in a face-off with the addicted, breathless soldiers of the United States. Thus naturally Washington once again is making a big mistake, and is making preparations for the great satan to be hoist by its own petard.

During its 22 years of struggles against the great satan, the Iranian nation never had the strength and preparedness it now has to confront plots. In the years before the victory of the Islamic revolution, the weapons of the Iranian people against the United States and its armed-to-the-teeth domestic puppets were solely the fist and 'God is great'. In the years after the victory of the Islamic revolution, although the armed forces of the Army, the Revolution Guards and the Mobilization were added to the fist and 'God is great', the combat readiness of these forces never was what it is today. Today the revolutionary nation of Iran possesses the fist, 'God is great', the armed forces of the Army, the Guards and the Mobilization, in addition to superior effectiveness and combat strength.

From another angle, the Muslim nation of Iran now has at its disposal the valuable capital of its past experiences, particularly its experiences during the years following the victory of the Islamic revolution. We have profited by this experience, and there is incomparable unity and harmony among the nation's various strata, and incomparable coordination, unanimity and unity of purpose among the officials. This constitutes the firmest, strongest barrier to the enemy's plots. Therefore the great satan should have less hope now than at any time in the past for the success of its plots against the Iranian nation.

It is obvious to the Iranian nation that the United States is the basic agent of the convulsion in the Persian Gulf and the entire region. It is also clear that the Saudi rulers and the Zionists ruling Baghdad are nothing more than the great satan's puppets. In the imposed war the Islamic Republic of Iran has proved that it will sever the hand of any aggressor with great force. In this respect there is no difference between the Saudi rulers and the 'Aflaqi rulers in Baghdad. Whenever necessary, Islam's soldiers will deal with Saddam's supporters as they have dealt with Saddam. What is important here is that the United States should enter the fray against the Islamic republic with a more exact calculation. What the United States should know is that the Islamic republic is more powerful than it has ever been, and that the Muslim, revolutionary nation of Iran, with greater unity and harmony than ever before, is ready to deliver another strong slap to the face of the great satan. If the United States wants to obtain this slap in the Persian Gulf, in the name of God...

9597

CSO: 4640/285

MAS'UD RAJAVI COMMENTS ON GULF WAR, KHOMEYNI'S ATTITUDES

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 60, 2 Jun 84 pp 12-13

[Interview with the leader of the Mojadin-e Khalq by Bakr 'Uwaydah: "The Regime Will Do Everything it Can to Internationalize the War; I Way to the Arab Gulf States That Khomeyni Understands Only the Language of Force"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Persons coming from Iran tell AL-TADAMUN: Iranian families are helping their children to flee the country; it costs 25,000 pounds sterling to enable a child to leave.

If I may say so, all the problems and concerns of the seven industrial countries will be on one scale and concerns over developments in the Iraqi-Iranian war will be on the opposite scale. When the leaders of these seven industrial nations (United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan) hold their summit meeting in Lancaster House in Britain next Wednesday, the developments in this war will be a ghost hovering over their heads, which has perhaps been the demand for a resolution to help end the war or allow it to continue and expand until it drags them into it. AL-TADAMUN met with some of the arrivals from Iran and spoke on the telephone with Mas'ud Rajavi, an Iranian resistance leader, in his headquarters in France in order to transmit some of the most important features of the picture which forces itself on everyone.

The time: The fourth, dawn Sunday 20 May 1984.

The place: Departure area at Mehrabad International Airport in Tehran.

The picture: Dozens of Iranian families are gathered together in groups, weeping and kissing one another, in one of the moving sights that together amount a tragic picture. The families are saying farewell to their children who are to travel on Iranian Airline flight IR731 from Tehran to London via Rome. The children ranging in age from 10 to 13 years are accepting this flood of tears and kisses without asking many questions. The jumbo jet was on the runway waiting to take off at 8 am. Approximately half of those on board that morning consisted of the children whose families were in such financial and opportune circumstances that they could afford to help their children escape before being thrown into the oven of war. Ayatollah Khomeyni hurls those who have reached the age of 14 to the battlefield!

Nothing prolongs the life of the regime as much as this war does, says one of those who arrived in London on the same plane. If peace occurred and the war ended, the Iranians would turn to Ayatollah Khomeyni and ask him: What did you do to us and to Iran? It is no exaggeration to say that they will not wait too long for an answer to the question, for their hearts are heavy and their spirits in turmoil as never happened in the time of the shah with all the terror, corruption, and perversion that stained the period--the speaker adds--because in those days Iranians were not forced to help their children flee and it did not cost the equivalent of 25,000 pounds sterling to do so. No one brought fear, anxiety, poverty, and deprivation down upon the people in the name of Islam and under its umbrella. In fact, the people were angry at a corrupt regime and they did not hide that from anyone!

The arrivals from Iran paint a dark picture. They are not supporters of the shah nor do they seek the return of his heir to power. Indeed, if asked about the return of the shah's son to power, they would answer at once and without hesitation: "No...there is no chance." But the people look back with regret upon the days of the shah, as if to say: "We did not know what lay ahead. If man knew the future, he would not be surprised by the present."

Despite this dark picture with all the bleakness of the times and bleakness of life and the necessity to deal with the black market, which is run by the Revolutionary Guards themselves, despite all this gloom, the arrivals from Iran tell us that the regime can survive because of the war. That is why it rejects every attempt to stop the war, even though the number of deserters from the army and from the front increases day by day and even though there are no longer many inducements to join the Revolutionary Guards. However, the mere continuation of the war and the stocking of its blazing fires is a game that the regime plays very well and successfully uses to provide the means of its survival.

As for a widening of the war after the bombing of the Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers, the arrivals from Iran say that may well happen. The feeling of the Iranians that the war will end soon is virtually nonexistent, indeed it is likely to widen. They ascribe this to the fact that Khomeyni himself does not want the war to stop. On the contrary, he would be happy if it widened because that would prolong the life of his regime.

Rajavi: He Wants to Internationalize the War

Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq agrees in this respect with what the arrivals from Iran say. Herewith is a summary of our telephone interview with Mr Rajavi last Tuesday evening.

[Question] What about internationalization of the war and the possibility of its widening?

[Answer] We believe the Khomeyni regime will do everything in its power to widen and prolong the war even if this leads to its internationalization and direct involvement of the big powers. The reason is that the regime and Khomeyni personally no longer have any means of covering up the military and political defeats except by the war itself. For, after the failure of the six huge offensives called Al-Fajr and after the deterioration in the internal Iranian situation and the failure of the lie of the last elections, this regime has only the war card, which it is playing with a great deal of hatred even to the disadvantage of the Iranian themselves who have sacrificed so far in this war about a million dead and wounded. The regime still insists on its continuing because, I repeat, it is its only way out.

[Question] But do you believe the foreign powers, especially the West or the seven industrial countries who are directly concerned with the war developments, whose interests are affected and whose leaders are meeting in London this week, do you believe they will become embroiled in the war?

[Answer] Khomeyni will try to embroil them. He wants to internationalize the war, which is in his interest and in the interest of the regime. These countries could avoid direct involvement and help end the war if they choked the Khomeyni regime economically. I should like to mention in this regard that I wrote to the foreign ministers of these countries asking them in the name of the Iranians to embargo Khomeyni's oil because the oil is now Khomeyni's oil, which he uses to finance his war machine, and not the Iranian people's oil that goes for development and the well-being of the Iranians. Yes, I asked that, especially from the Japanese who import a large share of the Iranian oil. If these countries did that, they would both avoid internationalization of the war and hasten its end. All we need to know here, according to the latest reports reaching me from Iran, is that the Iraqi blockade of Iranian ports has led to a curtailment of Khomeyni oil exports by 60 percent. That is why the regime is frantic and trying fiercely to internationalize the war in order to prolong its survival.

[Question] What do you think is the American stand on this matter?

[Answer] It is clear that during the last 3 years the American administration did not want Khomeyni to lose the war. We need only recall that Israel would not have supplied Khomeyni with arms without the American administration's blessing and approval. Therefore, the United States bears a large measure of responsibility for the continuation of the war and the survival of Khomeyni's regime. However, the recent developments made the United States realize that Khomeyni's regime does not threaten only the Iranians and the Iraqis. America was not greatly interested in the lives lost in the war nor was it interested at all in the executions that took place in Iran. The fact is it became interested (only) when it realized that the regime was moving the war in a direction likely to completely destroy security and stability in the Gulf as a whole, resulting in the fire burning America's fingers. So its attitude has changed. That is the real reason for the sudden concern and recent awakening of the United States.

[Question] Press reports think it likely that a land offensive will begin against Iraq, an offensive for which Khomeyni is said to have massed half a million persons for the first week of Ramadan, that is, next week. What is your view of the matter?

[Answer] To begin with, I must say that the Western media exaggerate the numbers when they talk about these attacks either because they lack information or intentionally. As for the figures, confirmed information that we received from Iranian military men inside and outside Iran indicate that the largest number that Khomeyni can mobilize is no more than 250,000 men whom he must spread over all the fronts. Moreover, he cannot assign to the offensive to which you referred in your question more than 80,000 to 100,000 men. As for launching the offensive, I do not believe the circumstances are favorable because the factors that have delayed it still exist, indeed they have worsened. As I mentioned earlier, the Iraqi blockade has reduced oil exports by 60 percent, inflicting on Khomeyni and his military machine a loss estimated at \$1.2 billion. Two weeks ago, Rafsanjani (president of Khomeyni's parliament) clearly announced that if the situation continues this way, the Iranians might not find any bread. Therefore, I do not think the regime will concentrate at this time on a land offensive, especially since no regime can tolerate a new military failure on top of six similar failures.

[Question] So are you pessimistic about the possibility of Khomeyni's stirring up other Arab regimes in the Gulf, especially in the light of his threats several days ago in which he gave the impression that he had elements inside some of the Gulf countries? Do you think he can really instigate some elements to create turmoil inside some of the Arab Gulf countries?

[Answer] Instigation is a potential problem. As I told you in my answer to your previous question, the man wants the war to continue and widen. To achieve that, he will do anything in his power to stir up the Iranians living among their brother Arabs in the Gulf states. This is one of his many tricks. He tried first of all with the Shiites in Iraq. He said he commanded them to "revolt". What was the result? No one responded to him or to the trickery that he practices. I always warned about the method used by Khomeyni. I told many of the brother Arabs whom I met that Khomeyni is the kind of person who if you give him an inch, he'll take a yard. Moreover, he becomes more arrogant whenever you show some weakness or fear. The only language he understands is the language of force and self-confidence. This reminds me of what happened in Iran when the Tudeh Party and before it Bazargan and his friends believed there was a possibility of reaching a mutual understanding with Khomeyni. The result was liquidation of the Tudeh Party and everyone knows what happened to Bazargan. The Mojahedin-e Khalq held out because it used the same logic that Khomeyni uses with others, the logic of force. Hence, the Arab Gulf states must not magnify the importance of Khomeyni's threats by appearing to be frightened by them. Rather, they should also confront them with force.

[Question] Some suggest that the war will continue as long as Khomeyni is alive. Moreover, some doubt the possibility of your winning or of the resistance agreeing on bringing about change before Khomeyni dies.

[Answer] Regarding the first part of the question, they are absolutely right, that is, the war will not stop as long as Khomeyni is alive and at the head of the decrepit regime in Iran. However, if the international powers cooperate and respond favorably to what we and other Iranian resistance forces proposed on the need for a total economic and military boycott of Khomeyni's regime, the war would definitely come to an end because the regime which spends 75 percent of Iran's income on the war will be unable to finance its war machine. With the end of the war, there will be an opportunity to topple the regime that has executed 40,000 persons to date just for resisting it. The shah against whom we revolted did not do it because he executed (only) a few hundred persons. As for our not winning or bringing about change as long as Khomeyni lives, this is a logic we refuse to accept because it is ideologically opposed to the logic of the revolutionaries. True, some resistance forces are betting on victory before Khomeyni dies and creating a vacuum that will pave the way for bringing about change, but we reject this logic. We believe Khomeyni's death is a matter between him and his God. We are working to overthrow him while he is alive and are trying to achieve it without his dying before we do so. I can say that we are half way to this goal. Suffice it to note here that the operations of our elements between March 1983 and March 1984 resulted in the death of 4000 of Khomeyni's guards. Should peace come, it would undoubtedly help us to complete the cycle of change. Hence, we have adopted the slogan "Peace...and Freedom", that is, peace with our neighbors and freedom for our people.

[Question] How do you see the future of Iraqi-Iranian relations after the war and after Khomeyni? Some think it is difficult to envision the Iraqis and the Iranians living with a common border and in peace after so much blood has been shed.

[Answer] We lived for a century and a half without wars and peace and good relations prevailed during this period. What happened with the arrival of Khomeyni is that the man knew from the beginning how to steal the leadership of the revolution from the hands of the true revolutionaries. So he found in his possession revolutionary power he did not know how, or absolutely did not want, to direct toward building Iran and contributing to its well-being and progress. In fact, he began to speak of "exporting the revolution" and creating an empire like the Ottoman empire. Because he believed the Iraqi Shites might follow him, he began with them. The choice of Iraq as a starting point for launching the war against it and interfering in its affairs or "exporting the revolution" to it first was no accident in the sense the Khomeyni did not start a war against Pakistan or Afghanistan. He chose Iraq because he believed it could be the first stage in realizing his dreams of an empire.

In answering your question, I come now to the heart of the matter, which is that the future of relations between Iraq and Iran depends largely on the kind of regime that will arise in Iran after the war and Khomeyni. If it is a progressive regime, one concerned with the interests of Iran, its progress, and well-being, it will have to strive to direct all of its energies toward this goal. But if the regime proves to be reactionary and backward, as is the case now, war will always be a way out for regimes that want to keep their people in subjugation and conceal their weakness and reactionary character.

[Question] Finally, are you optimistic about returning to Iran soon?

[Answer] Yes...yes and very soon.

5214

CSO: 4604/29

USE OF PAGARA'S FOLLOWERS AS LAWEN OPPOSED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 14 Jun 84 pp 7-8

[Article in the "Between the Lines" column: "Bhej Pagara"]

[Text]

THE SIND Government's decision to raise an auxiliary force to assist the police to meet the growing threat to peace from proliferating groups of dacoits is certainly justified; but the recruitment of a partisan group bound by blood-curdling oaths to serve a local Pir is not wise, nor is it likely to prove useful.

The Hurs may once have been accepted as some sort of a national force, mainly because of their struggle against the Raj under the present Pir Pagara's respected father. They were hired later in certain emergencies and this was generally considered unobjectionable, but their enlistment in a special police contingent to deal with dacoits in today's Sind will not be viewed in the same light. Public reaction to the move has generally been hostile because the present Pir plays a quasi-political role. Anyhow, in our tribal, faction-ridden society, responsibility for law and order must remain with nonpartisan elements. The instruments of State power must be neutral, non-partisan; they must have no political role. In the circumstances, appointing the Pagara Mujahid force gauleiters as police inspectors will not be conducive to giving strength to the anti-dacoity operations.

First loyalty

By all means let the police force be

expanded and strengthened, and any person able and willing to join the effort to suppress lawlessness should be inducted into the auxiliaries; but every recruit, whether sepoy or officer, must offer the convincing guarantee that his first loyalty is to the State, and that he will be bound always by the regulations and discipline of the force he joins, irrespective of the situation he faces during the projected operations in the Sind countryside. Will not a Hur Mujahid's loyalty be given always to his Pir? Whatever the orders he receives from his officers, how will he loyally obey an alien command when he hears the cry of "Bhej Pagara"? One believes earnestly that the Hur recruitment scheme should be reviewed not only because of the weakness in its short-term aims but also because of its feared long-term consequences.

The misgivings voiced make a lot of sense. It is accepted on all sides that what certain districts of Sind are witnessing is not an upsurge of dacoities and robberies resulting from economic distress as has often happened in many parts of the sub-continent. It is apparently a more unusual phenomenon, namely, that the dacoits are engaged in a form of protest — social and political. This crop of outlaws seemingly follow the traditions of Dulla Bhatti or Robin Hood, the rob-the-rich-and-help-the-poor brand of adventurers who often become heroes of folk song and popular legend. Since this aspect is conceded

by Government spokesmen as well as by other observers, it makes it all the more necessary to ensure that the agents of the State designated to deal with the situation go in with completely clean hands and cannot be accused by anyone of being for or against any of the many factions that seem to be involved in the free-for-all tussle.

One hopes that the Federal Government -- with a Home Minister associated with Sind -- will reconsider the whole issue, in consultation with the Sind Government, and work out a better plan for coping with the situation. And since its political implications are acknowledged, this facet should also be dealt with as soon as possible.

CSO: 4600/636

INDIA-PAKISTAN TALKS; NEW HOPE SEEN

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 14 Jun 84 pp 15-16

[Text] THE QUIETNESS (but not unconcern) with which the news of the military action against the Sikh militants next door was received, reflected Islamabad's keenness to keep the momentum of the Indo-Pakistan talks, said to have achieved a certain degree of ascendancy toward the apex. Observers here contrast Pakistan's reaction to that of Indira Gandhi's to the MRD last year when she expressed sympathy for those struggling in Sind, evoking sharp reaction in Islamabad and retarding the process of normalisation then in progress.

It is hoped that the Golden Temple operation and its aftermath will not affect the exchange of visits and talks scheduled during the coming weeks.

Informed sources in Islamabad are very optimistic about the success of the talks with India and go to the extent of saying that an agreement may be signed sooner than expected--if not before that "one major election this year" (in October).

India Keen

There are indications, it is said, to show that Indira Gandhi is very keen now on the signing of the treaty 'as soon as possible' for, she thinks, it is said, the time is most opportune, with, what she figures out, a "stable" regime in Pakistan and she at the helm of affairs in New Delhi--a theory similar to the thoughts of the late Ayub Khan who tried to cajole her father Nehru with 'you in India and I in Pakistan' to come to an understanding on the Kashmir issue in view of what he called the 'danger from the north'.

With Kashmir swept under the carpet and only the Line of Actual Control left to man, things would surely be easier for the two to tackle.

The other compelling factor is said to be the mounting "pressure" from the oil-rich Arab States who, when Indira visited some recently, told her to mend her fences with their good friend and ally (Pakistan).

It is surmised that the US Vice-President George Bush, too, during his visit to New Delhi before coming to Pakistan, counselled the Indian Prime Minister pointing out the good that would flow from Indo-Pakistan cooperation.

Add to this the "pressure" from Japan's Nakasone who, too, was in New Delhi and who is said to have told Indira that peace and stability in the region were a prerequisite for Japanese investment in India.

The Indians have also noted a softening in the CMLA-President's attitude on two questions, of bases and bilateralism, as well as resistance to Indo-Pakistan trade, as reflected in his interviews with UNI and AIR. On trade the CMLA is reported to have said that Pakistan need not go elsewhere for what she can buy cheap from its neighbour. And India is keen to have trade with Pakistan and this statement will surely be welcomed in New Delhi.

A Dramatic Opening

The optimists go to the extent of not ruling out a dramatic opening, a last minute removal of the last hurdle, as happened at Simla, (or by-passing it?) in the way of an agreement.

They say that the two sides have more or less been able to agree on the nomenclature of the treaty.

Is then a meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and CMLA-President on the cards--'and this year?

Those who had been arguing that Indians were in no hurry and would like to wait till at least the CMLA's August Plan is implemented, or otherwise, stick to their guns, depending more on India's past record than the current international scene and its imperatives.

It has now officially been announced that the Joint (Indo-Pakistan) Ministerial Commission will meet in New Delhi from August 6 to 9. This will be the second annual meeting of the commission since its inception in 1982 to enlarge cooperation in various economic, social and cultural fields. The two Foreign Ministers will review the progress made by their Secretaries in evolving a joint draft on Pakistan's proposal for a no-war pact and Indian offer of a treaty of peace and friendship. The two would have met earlier in New Delhi from July 18 and it is expected that they would be able to further narrow down the differences on a unified draft.

CSO: 4600/636

BUDGET COMMENTARY: ECONOMY SAID 'IN DISTRESS'

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 21 Jun 84 pp 5-6

[Article in "Viewpoint" column: "Economy in Distress"]

[Text] WHILE preparing the next fiscal year's budget, the Federal Finance Minister was obviously working under constraints of a nature unprecedented in his seven-year-old tenure. On the one hand, he had to reckon with the serious setback suffered by the economy during the current fiscal and, on the other, he could not ignore the regime's political requirements in a year fixed for elections and transition to a new political structure. But an even more restrictive factor apparently is the persistence with an economic model that the people find inconsistent with their visions of collective progress and equitable distribution of the fruits of economic growth, and with a method of planning and development whose efficacy is already in doubt. Unfortunately, in view of the newly-adopted style of presenting economic reviews and budget statements, in which the emphasis has shifted from simple and intelligible stock-taking of performance and promise to long-winded exposition of theories — such as the one on the 'roots of economic liberalism' pub-

lished with pretensions to profundity in the latest Economic Survey —, a complete evaluation of the budgetary and development proposals for the year 1984-85 will be possible only after all the relevant documents have been critically studied. For the moment one should concentrate on the broad features of the strategy devised by the custodians of the national economy, on an overview of the economic scene.

That the current year has shown big shortfalls is plain enough. Though the magnitude of the setback is, perhaps, greater than so far realised, even by authors of official estimates — which inspire less and less confidence as computerised rigmarole becomes more and more confounding —, admittedly the economy has been badly mauled. The increase in GNP is estimated at 4.6 per cent as against 7.8 per cent in 1982-83; the balance of payments has deteriorated, and the current account deficit has gone up to one billion dollars from 558 million dollars last year; remittances from expatriate wor-

kers — the mainstay of the economy for many years — have increased by a mere 3 per cent as against 29.7 per cent last year; the rate of inflation is estimated at 9.6 per cent as compared to 6 per cent in 1982-83; consumer prices have risen this year by 8.7 per cent as against 4.1 per cent last year; and industrial growth — despite the addition of a hot-strip mill to the Pakistan Steel Mills and the commissioning of three new cement factories — is estimated at 8 per cent against the target of 9 per cent.

All this has been ascribed to the effect of adverse weather on agriculture which has shown negative growth for the first time in a decade — a fall of 4.6 per cent over the 1982-83 level as against the average improvement by 4.5 per cent during the past few years. The Finance Minister has described in detail the numerous steps taken during the current year to cushion the effects of these shortfalls and defined the process of recovery as a principal economic objective for the next fiscal. But one wishes he had given due consideration to the obvious lesson that if weather can sometimes help the economy's managers to claim vindication of their plans, it can also upset all of their neatly worked out calculations. Since the weather is a permanent imponderable, one expects that serious attention should be paid to reducing the economy's vulnerability, specially agriculture's, to nature's vagaries — although in the present case the damage caused by failure to regulate pesticide use could hardly be ignored in the way it has been.

What is being done to insure farming against nature's fickleness or to reduce its impact? For instance, are we prepared to overcome lack of rainfall by utilising the millions of acre-feet of river waters that flow down to the sea or to ensure an increase in production, even in a lean year, by guaranteeing more intensive land use through radical changes in land ownership and tenure patterns? What do we propose to do to protect agriculture against the manifestly unscrupulous functioning of the pesticide sector? These are crucial issues of policy and cannot be disposed of by reference to sectoral allocations in the Annual Development Plans. This is far more important a matter than the exercise to work out a growth target for 1984-85 which could offset this year's shortfall and yield the magic figure of 6 per cent growth rate as the average for two years.

It is surprising that nothing has been said about the Government's management of its revenues this year or in the next one. While it is satisfying to note that during the present year the current expenditure (at Rs. 59,969.6 million) is less than the revenue receipts (Rs. 61,892.3 million) and in the new fiscal, too, current expenditure (Rs. 65,260.5 million) is expected to be less than the revenue (Rs. 66,662.5 million), the steady increase in spending on this head — estimated at 8.8 per cent in the new fiscal — should be a matter of concern. This expenditure stood at Rs. 20,197.4 million in 1977-78 and rose to Rs. 59,969.6 million in 1983-84 (up by 200 per cent in six years, and at the end of the new fiscal the percentage will have risen to 225), the

corresponding rise over six years in expenditure on general administration being from Rs. 1,120.2 million to Rs. 3,516.5 million (an increase of 218 per cent), and in the defence expenditure being about 180 per cent. The Government cannot be unaware of the persistent clamour by public representatives against these rising expenditures and in recognition of which an economy cut of Rs. 692 million in the revenue budget was announced in June 1983 (that the revised figures exceed the estimates by Rs. 316.7 million is a different matter).

The reluctance of the Government to learn to live within its means has a most damaging effect on public habits as well as on the economy. An administration that does not display austerity and a capacity to curtail its own expenditure is unlikely to acquire effective arguments against the public aberrations of consumerism and ostentatious living. More significantly; unchecked growth in expenditure on the establishment cuts into the State's ability to increase its contribution to the funds needed for development. It can be seen that while the contribution of external resources to the ADP for 1984-85 is, happily, less than the level in the past years (around 50 per cent), it is still at a high level – around 41 per cent. One should be careful in relying on the arithmetical fiction of 85 per cent of the development being financed with indigenous resources – the figure can be arrived at by deducting the debt payment from the gross inflow or by working out the percentage of expected aid to the gross budget –, because the fact of considerable dependence on foreign aid cannot be glossed over. At the same time, the resource constraints

are manifest; despite our success in receiving more foreign aid than requested, the fact remains that allocations for the ADP in the next fiscal, as in the current year, have fallen below the Sixth Plan projections.

These constraints, specially, and the overall economic prospect, in general, call for bold and radical remedies which will obviously demand considerable sacrifices, not only from the public but also the Government, of money as well as concepts. Some of the possible remedies might have been discarded in order to avoid shocks to the public in a crucial year and some obviously had to be given up because they conflict with the declared mission of resuscitating the market economy system in a soil unsuited to it and in a climate which is decidedly unfavourable. The possibility of siphoning off the extra agricultural incomes into the State exchequer or reducing the concessions to the private sector have, therefore, not been considered. The fixation of ADP targets at modest levels also was not considered expedient, hence a resource gap of Rs. 8.5 billion.

The Finance Minister proposes to raise only Rs. 2.96 billion from new and revised taxation measures, and believes that the balance amounting to Rs. 5.62 billion is a safe figure for deficit financing, although in June 1983 he was ready to raise Rs. 6.65 billion from taxation to reduce the resource gap by about 50 per cent. The burden of even this effort – through increase in fuel charges, duties on cigarettes and beverages – will fall on the common man not only directly but also through adverse effect on the entire price line. Again more irksome than the additional burden would be the feeling that given a greater faith in social

justice and equity, the responsibility for meeting the resource gap could have been more evenly distributed among the rich and the poor.

The condition of the economy, the times, and the widening gap between the egalitarian aspirations of the people and reality demand an honest searching of the heart, a willingness to shed illusions. A country where the sole objective of economic effort is achievement of growth rates stipulated by outside agencies, regardless of considerations of public weal, where imports cannot be checked for fear of alienating the foreign donors or the IMF, where a leap into a five-day week is considered preferable to enforcement of energy cuts on the establishment, where the luxury of VCRs must be allowed because evasion of duty cannot be stopped, where the black economy is not considered worth attending to, where pragmatism can be sacrificed to doctrinaire faith in the virtues of a dying system or the pursuit of chimerical slogans rooted in emotions rather than economic sense — is a country that has cast itself adrift on the treacherous waves of uncertainty. The situation can be faced and the nation mobilised for the requisite effort, and the sacrifices that it might entail, provided the direction of change is clear and promising and the credit of the taskmasters and the mechanism of accountability inspire people's confidence.

URBAN, RURAL DISPARITY SAID TO HINDER ECONOMIC GROWTH

Karachi DAWN in English 15 Jun 84 Business Supplement p I

[Text] ISLAMABAD; Jun 14: The Government is giving special attention to remove the wide disparity in the urban and rural areas which is not only undesirable but also hampers the growth of the economy and create imbalances says Pakistan's economic survey released here on Tuesday evening.

To remove the disparity, rural development programmes are being implemented through the institutions of local bodies, and special development programmes have been chalked out for the development of Baluchistan and federal and tribal areas which are predominantly rural in character.

The survey further states that there was a disparity between the standard of living of rural and urban populations. The average rural income is far less than the per capita urban income. Many essential services like health, education, drinking water, sanitation, farm to market roads and electricity are insufficient.

This was the reason that, the survey added, rural development survey strategy had been directed towards the productivity of land and labour, meeting of the basic needs of the traditional rural communities in respect of road communication, power, health, education, nutrition, drinking water, and the upgradation of skills.

Rural development programme being implemented in the country is aimed at integrating meaningfully rural development with the national socio-economic development efforts and to reduce the burden of under employment, besides increasing the density and intensity of services provided to the agriculture and other rural activities.

The programme is aimed at creating institutional framework for ensuring community's participation in its implementation.

The induction of 54,811 elected councillors in 83 district councils, 3656 union councils, 273, town committees and 36 cantonment boards all over the country with a mandate to develop the potential of their respective areas has got the responsibility to carry out the rural development programme most effectively.

BRIEFS

STEEL RESEARCH INSTITUTE PLANNED--KARACHI: June 14. An institute of research and development will be established in Pakistan by the UNIDO for training and research in the field of steel-making. The institute will be established at the Pakistan Steel but all other national industries relating to iron and steel, irrespective of private or public sectors, would benefit from this institute. Addressing the recently concluding session of International seminar on iron and steel, the UNIDO's Mr B. R. Najhawan said that his Organisation would send senior engineers to Pakistan steel to Japan and West Germany for advance training under the technical cooperation programme. Under the programme, skilled persons of relatively less developed countries would be provided training at the Pakistan Steel, he added. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 15 Jun 84 Business Supplement p 1]

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